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ABSTRACT 
South Africa has played an essential role as one of the founding members of both the 
League of Nations and the United Nations (UN), the latter of which came into 
existence in 1945. However, when the South African government introduced and 
pursued its policy of Apartheid, the country became a pariah within the international 
community. In 1994, after twenty years of international isolation, a new democratic 
government was sworn in and was immediately embraced by the international 
community.  
 
In their quest to further strengthen South Africa’s ongoing transformation from an 
isolated international pariah to an emerging leader of the developing world, the 
Mandela and Mbeki administrations adopted foreign policy adaptation strategies. 
These strategies were designed to adapt South African’s foreign policy to the new 
realities of the post-apartheid era: restructuring the foreign policy establishment; self-
promotion as the leader of the ‘African Renaissance’; adherence to the foreign policy 
principle of ‘universality’ and assuming a leadership role in international 
organizations.  
 
The United Nations has became one of the most important forums through which the 
international community’s rapprochement towards South Africa has manifested itself 
and has continued to play an important role in  post-Apartheid South Africa’s 
international relations. South Africa’s global status has increased significantly through 
its participation in numerous UN bodies, agencies and General Assembly sessions. It 
has thus been argued that South Africa’s participation at the United Nations is driven 
by its intention to reform the organisation as well as showcase itself as a 
representative of the developing world and especially Africa, in an attempt to increase 
its global stature as a moral and African power. In addition to this it ostensibly seeks 
to profile itself as a multilateral leader. 
 
This thesis attempts to explore the nature of South Africa’s involvement and 
participation within the United Nations in the Post-Apartheid era and what the major 
consequences have been. It assesses the content and consequences of South African 
foreign policy rhetoric and institutional participation at the United Nations since the 
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end of apartheid. This is done, first, through an attempt to understand the role of 
international organisations within the international arena and how they are utilised in 
furthering foreign policy objectives of states through cooperation (which constitutes 
the theoretical backdrop to the thesis), and second, through a systematic review of 
South African behaviour and policy objectives at the United Nations. Amongst others, 
one of the more important themes emerging from this analysis is that South Africa is 
combining many of its more recent UN initiatives with its participation in other 
multilateral partnerships. 
 v
OPSOMMING 
Suid-Afrika het ‘n belangrike rol as een van die stigterslede van beide die Volkebond 
en die Verenigde Nasies (VN) gespeel, met laasgenoemde wat in 1945 tot stand 
gekom het. Toe die Suid-Afrikaanse regering egter sy beleid van Apartheid ingebring 
en daarmee volgehou het, het die land ‘n uitgewekene binne die internasionale 
gemeenskap geword. In 1994, na twintig jaar van internasiomale isolasie,  het ‘n nuwe 
demokratiese regering tot stand gekom wat onmiddelik deur die res van die wêreld 
aanvaar is. 
 
In hul pogings om Suid-Afrika verder te versterk en te onwikkel van ‘n uitgewekene 
tot ‘n opkomende leier van die ontwikkelende wêreld, het die Mandela- en Mbeki-
adminstrasies aanpassings aan hulle buitelandse beleidstrategieë gemaak. Hierdie 
strategieë is geskep om Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid te laat aanpas en in 
ooreenstemming te bring met die nuwe realiteite en eise van die Post-Apartheidera: 
die herstrukturering van buitelandse beleid, Suid-Afrika se poging om die land te 
bevorder en te bemark as die leier van die ‘Afrika Renaissance’, gehoor te gee aan die 
beleidsbeginsel van ‘universaliteit’ en om ‘n leiersrol aan te neem in internasionale 
organisasies. 
 
Die Verenigde Nasies het een van die belangrikste forums geword waardeur 
internasionale gemeenskappe se toegeneëntheid jeëns Suid-Afrika gemanifesteer is. 
Die VN het voortgegaan om ‘n belangrike rol in die Nuwe Suid-Afrika se 
internasionale verhoudings te speel. Suid-Afrika se internasionale status het 
insiggewend gegroei weens die land se betrokkenheid in verskeie VN-organisasies, 
agentskappe en Algemene Vergaderingsessies. Daar is gevolglik al gesê dat Suid-
Afrika se betrokkenheid in die Verenigde Nasies aangevuur word deur sy voorneme 
om die organisasie te hervorm en terselfdertyd die land te bemark as ‘n 
verteenwoordiger van die ontwikkelende wêreld en in besonder Afrika, in ‘n poging 
om Suid-Afrika se statuur as ‘n moreel-etiese Afrikakrag te verhoog en te bevorder. In 
annsluiting hiermee poog die land toenemend om homself as ‘n multilaterale leier uit 
te beeld. 
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Hierdie studie poog om die aard van Suid-Afrikaanse betrokkenheid in en deelname 
binne die Verenigde Nasies in die Post-Apartheidera, asook die grootste gevolge van 
Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleidsoortuiginge en institusionele deelname aan die 
Verenigde Nasies sedert die beëindiging van Apartheid te beoordeel. Dit word 
gedoen, eerstens, deur ‘n poging om die rol van internasionale organisasies  binne die 
internasionale arena en hoe hulle aangewend word tot die verbetering van buitelandse 
beleidsdoelwitte deur samewerking (wat die teoretiese grondslag van hierdie studie is) 
te verstaan en tweedens deur ‘n sistematiese oorsig van Suid-Afrikaanse gedrag en 
beleidsdoelwitte by die Verenigde Nasies. Een van die belangrikste temas wat deur 
hierdie studie na vore kom, is dat Suid-Afrika baie van sy mees onlangse VN-
inisiatiewe met sy betrokkenheid in multilaterale belangegroepe kombineer. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
“Just over 10 years ago, apartheid South Africa was an outlaw, an outcast from the 
community of nations. As we rejoice at the achievement of democracy and freedom, 
we also celebrate our elevation to global partner and a champion for Africa and other 
developing nations, and a bridge between North and South”  
- President Nelson Mandela1 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
South Africa has played an essential role as one of the founding members of both the 
League of Nations and the United Nations (UN), the latter of which came into 
existence in 1945. However, when the South African government introduced and 
pursued its policy of Apartheid, the country became a pariah within the international 
community (Geldenhuys, 1984). This fall from grace witnessed South Africa’s 
withdrawal from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and later its other 
specialised agencies. As opposition grew against its racist policies, South Africa 
became further isolated from international relations on a multilateral scale. 
  
For twenty years (1974-1994) the isolation and international non-participation of the 
Apartheid regime had the “perverse advantage”, in that the newly elected government 
would not be “burdened with long established policy positions that might have been 
difficult to change” (Wheeler, 2004:86). Therefore, after the first democratic elections 
in 1994, the South African government started tabula rasa, and embraced its ability to 
reengage in the global arena.  
 
The period between 1994 and 2000 was manifested with South African multilateral 
activity and leadership responsibilities as the country “acceded to about seventy 
multilateral treaties, initiatives and joined or rejoined more than forty inter-
                                                 
1 Mandela, N. “Preface” in E. Sidiropoulos (ed.). 2004. “Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future, South Africa’s 
Foreign Policy: 1994-2004”. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). 
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governmental institutions” (Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen, 2001: 1). South 
Africa set out to become a good “global citizen” (Wheeler, 2004: 86) and possibly 
define itself as a leader of the developing world by making contributions to debates on 
issues of global concern (Wheeler, 2004: 87). Multilateralism therefore became one of 
the cornerstones of post-Apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy.  
 
 The United Nations General Assembly became “one of the most important forums 
through which [the] international community’s rapprochement towards South Africa 
manifested” (Cornelissen, 2006: 26) and has continued to play an important role in  
post-Apartheid South Africa’s international relations. South Africa’s global status has 
increased significantly through its participation in numerous UN bodies, agencies and 
General Assembly sessions. Important concerns of Africa and the developing world, 
especially those relating to socio-economic development and security affairs, are of 
specific importance to South Africa as the country seeks to establish itself as a middle 
power – a state “that [is] neither great nor small in terms of international power, 
capacity and influence, and demonstrates a propensity to promote cohesion and 
stability in the world system” (Jordaan, 2003: 165). One reason the country seeks this 
new role is expectations from the international community (Barber, 2004:86).  There 
is a perception that South Africa has the requisite power, capacity, and prestige to 
fulfil this role and act as a bridge ensuring that North/South relations are non-
antagonistic and more equitable (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996). 
 
South Africa’s foreign policy has, however, been described as ambiguous 
characterised by contradictions, inconsistencies and incongruities (Nathan, 2005) and 
as a result impedes effective participation and achievement of goals within the UN 
forum. The structure of the UN has itself has become a hindrance, with respect to the 
power disparity between the global North and global South. It is often asked how 
effective the UN is at providing a voice for countries such as South Africa and 
whether the organisation’s existence is relevant in today’s world. The subject of 
United Nations reform has attracted increased attention, especially among the 
developing countries that tend to be more concerned with substantive reform like the 
restructuring of the Security Council.  South Africa like many others has made no 
secret of its aspirations to acquire a permanent seat on the Security Council. 
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  There is a significant shortage of academic work focussing specifically on South 
Africa’s participation in the United Nations in the post-Apartheid era. Deon 
Geldenhuys (1984) has written extensively on the foreign policy behaviour of the 
apartheid government during isolation, and towards the late 1980s and early 1990s 
foreign policy think-tanks, such as the Institute of International Affairs were 
commissioned by the South African government to act in the capacity of fact-
producing bodies, rather than influencing policy-making (Pfister, 2006: 23). In 1994 
The Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD), later, The Institute for Global Dialogue 
(IGD), at the request of Nelson Mandela, was funded by the German Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl, to assist in analysing the foreign policy challenges which the nascent 
Democratic South Africa would have to confront (Pfister, 2006: 23-24).   
 
Existing literature has thus expanded in giving an overview of South Africa’s first 
democratic elections and post-Apartheid foreign policy, but only focuses on certain 
aspects of its multilateralism (Taylor, 2001; Solomon, 1997; Van der Westhuizen, 
1998; Alden, 2003; Alden and Le Pere, 2003). Academics, Nel, Taylor and Van der 
Westhuizen (2000; 2001), have written extensively on South Africa’s multilateral 
reformist embrace within international fora and South Africa’s attempt to “punch 
above its weight” in pursuing its foreign policy goals within these institutions. Taylor 
(2001) has, through his neo-Gramscian theoretical approach to the global political 
economy, focused on the South Africa’s emergence as a global middle power or 
“bridge-builder”, as well as the conduct of a contradictory and ambiguous post-
Apartheid foreign policy within multilateral groupings and organisations. Hence, it has 
been argued that South Africa’s participation at the United Nations is driven by its 
intention to showcase itself as a representative of the developing world and especially 
Africa, in an attempt to increase its global stature as a moral and African power. In 
addition to this it ostensibly seeks to profile itself as a multilateral leader.  
 
This thesis assesses the content and consequences of South African foreign policy 
rhetoric and institutional participation at the United Nations since the end of apartheid. 
This is done, first, through an attempt to understand the role of international 
organisations within the international arena and how they are utilised in furthering 
foreign policy objectives of states through cooperation (which constitutes the 
theoretical backdrop to the study), and second, through a systematic review of South 
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African behaviour and policy objectives at the United Nations. An important emergent 
theme from this analysis is that South Africa is combining many of its more recent UN 
initiatives with its participation in other multilateral partnerships. 
1.2  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A number of primary and secondary research questions inform this study: 
 
The primary research question is as follows: 
 
What has been the nature of South Africa’s involvement and participation within the 
United Nations in the Post-Apartheid era and what have been the major consequences 
thereof as implication of its foreign policy objectives? 
 
Secondary research questions have been formulated in the following way: 
 
i) What has been South Africa’s orientation towards multilateralism after 1994 and 
how was this realised? 
ii) What has been the main form of South Africa’s institutional participation within 
the United Nations’ various organs, systems, and initiatives? 
iii) Have there been major processes or initiatives involving South Africa at the 
United Nations and what have the consequences been in South Africa’s attempt to 
become a middle power as resonated in its foreign policy? 
1.3  THEORETICAL CONCEPTS: MULTILATERALISM AND MIDDLE POWERS 
1.3.1  MULTILATERALISM 
Multilateralism can be defined as an “institutional form that coordinates relations 
among three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct” (Ruggie, 
1993:11).  As Ruggie (1993: 567) notes, “…what is distinctive about multilateralism 
is not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states, 
which is something that other organisational forms also do, but that it does so on the 
basis of certain principles of ordering relations amongst those states” (Ruggie, 1993: 
567). 
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As multilateral relations focus on global issues, this study will analyse multilateralism 
as a “deep organising principle of international life” (Caporaso, 1993:55) and look at 
South Africa's participation in and interaction primarily through multilateral 
institutions (in this case the United Nations), which forms the substance of its 
multilateral diplomacy. As global issues have domestic relevance, the role that South 
Africa seeks to play in the development of international thinking in these areas and 
how it is related not only to its international objectives but also to domestic policies is 
explored as well.  
As Black (2001:77) notes, “multilateralism [also] offers states like South Africa a 
means of enhancing their leverage and multiplying their influence while minimizing 
their exposure and risk on sensitive foreign policy issues”. By analyzing post-
apartheid South Africa’s multilateral activity, one will be able to define the country’s 
efforts at establishing itself as an “emerging” middle power. 
1.3.2  MIDDLE POWERS 
Taken from the work of Robert Cox (1996), Schoeman (2003: 350) uses the term 
middle power to denote, first, a position in a universal hierarchical order of states; 
second, size and rank in the international division of labour, which confers the 
opportunity to exert moral influence on the global system; and third, an interest in a 
stable international order that does not seek to impose “an ideologically preconceived 
vision of an ideal world order”. Most importantly, middle powers usually operate 
through multilateral avenues, since they cannot impose their vision on a global scale 
(Cox cited in Schoeman 2003). 
It is important to distinguish between “traditional” and “emerging” middle powers.  
The distinction is sometimes blurred both in theory and in practice.  The main 
distinction is that traditional middle powers including Canada, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states are usually from the Global North.  
Emerging middle powers such as South Africa, Brazil, and India are mostly from the 
Global South (Jordaan, 2003: 165). 
In his analysis Jordaan (2003: 168) distinguishes between traditional and emerging 
powers based on constitutive and behavioural differences.  The constitutive criteria 
look at the country’s democratic tradition, time of emergence as a middle power, 
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position in the world economy, domestic distribution of wealth, regional influence, 
and origin of perceived neutrality. The behavioural criteria are based on the country’s 
regional orientation, attitude to regional integration and cooperation, nature of actions 
to effect global change and its purpose of international identity construction. 
 
In the international political economy, traditional middle powers are the wealthy core 
states, with stable economies and democracies. They emerged during the Cold War, 
and did not really fit into either the Eastern or Western bloc. They do not exhibit any 
real regional power considering the surrounding regional powers, and are usually 
“appeasing and legitimizing” (Schoeman, 2003: 351). In contrast, emerging middle 
powers are generally young democracies that emerged as a result of the Cold War. 
These countries do not necessarily display exceptional democratic features, and form 
part of the semi-periphery (Schoeman, 2003: 351). Their economies are usually the 
strongest in their region and are therefore able to take the lead in regional structures 
and organisations.  Because of their regional influence, many countries rely on them 
to maintain and promote stability (Jordaan, 2003: 173). The middle power concept is a 
useful analytical tool which will be used to gauge South Africa’s foreign policy 
(international/multilateral) behaviour and attempts to “punch above its weight” on 
certain issues (i.e. the manner in which it engages in international affairs beyond what 
its economic size and position in the international system would determine) (Van der 
Westhuizen, 1998: 439). 
1.4  METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a qualitative and exploratory assessment of South Africa’s foreign 
policy behaviour and intents at the United Nations. Qualitative researchers rely on 
interpretive social science. They use a transcendent perspective, apply “logic in 
practice” and follow a non-linear research path (Neuman, 2000: 139). They usually 
try to present authentic interpretations that are sensitive to specific social historical 
contexts. Exploratory studies are most typically done for three purposes: to satisfy the 
researcher’s curiosity and desire for a better understanding; to test the feasibility of 
undertaking a more careful study; and to develop the methods to be employed in a 
more careful study (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 84). 
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With the intention of observing how South Africa has manifested its foreign policy 
objectives within its multilateral activity and behaviour, this thesis made use of 
secondary and primary material. Secondary material consisted of scholarly writing on 
the subject of post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy. Primary material consisted 
of government policies, speeches from key foreign policy role-players within the 
South African government, and from officials at South Africa’s Permanent Mission to 
the United Nations. Policies and speeches were analysed to determine the trends in 
South Africa’s foreign policy orientation over the past decade. Further, a simplified 
use of historical/comparative data analysis was undertaken with regards to South 
Africa’s development within the United Nations through an examination of the 
organisation’s official documents such as charters and policy statements. A final 
aspect of analyses entailed an investigation of the change in foreign policy between 
former President Nelson Mandela and that of President Thabo Mbeki, and how that 
may have affected the country’s UN behaviour. This form of trend study - noting 
change in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives at different times within the UN – 
enables conclusions to be drawn about the intentions and positions of major individual 
political figures, and the ramifications these bore.  
 
For reasons of practicality and due to time constraints, the time frame of analysis is 
from 1994 to March 2007. This time frame does preclude in-depth review of 
important developments in South Africa’s role at the United Nations since then, in 
particular relating to South Africa’s membership of the Security Council and some of 
the controversy which surrounded decisions taken by the South African diplomatic 
personnel in their capacity as representatives on the Council. The thesis does deal 
however with the early stages of South Africa’s membership on the Security Council 
and some of the trends which were emerging at that point. 
1.5  SIGNIFICANCE 
By providing an analysis of post-apartheid South Africa’s participation at the United 
Nations, this thesis highlights existing shortcomings and identifies new shortcomings 
within South Africa’s foreign policy as well as the United Nations as a multilateral 
organisation.  An attempt is made to assess how South Africa has projected itself as a 
middle power and representative of the developing world, and how these efforts 
played out at the United Nations. This thesis adds to an important gap in the literature 
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on post-apartheid South African foreign policy, in which although much attention has 
been given to the implications of the country’s multilateral orientation, whilst the 
issue of South Africa at the United Nations has been neglected. 
1.6  LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 
The limitations of this thesis include the lack of grounded academic work focusing 
mainly on South Africa and its participation at the United Nations. Research is also 
wholly based on qualitative and unobtrusive research and is entirely descriptive due to 
the unavailability of primary data and time constraints.  
Unobtrusive research is methods of studying social behavior without affecting it and 
can be qualitative and quantitative. Historical comparative analysis was one of the 
preferred methods of unobtrusive research, as it is a method for discovering what 
happened during some period in the past from records and accounts.  
Historical comparative analysis helps one to understand the historical nature of 
phenomena, events, people, agencies, and even institutions. In many ways, it may be 
as important as understanding the items themselves. There is no end of data available 
for analysis in historical research. Four types of historical data sources are used: oral 
records, artifacts and quantitative records. Primary sources are documents written by a 
witness to the events, whereas secondary sources are secondhand versions and 
therefore less accurate. Secondary sources are used as back-up data and when primary 
data is not available (Babbie, 2001:338-345).  
 Due to time constraints and availability of South African officials at the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, formal interviews could not be conducted. However, speeches 
from South Africa’s Presidents (both former and incumbent), the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and personnel of the Foreign Affairs ministry, as well as the representative to 
the United Nations, have been used to supplement the lack of primary sources of 
information. 
 
Further limitations in collecting primary research data  in the form of recording and 
analysing voting trends of South Africa within the major bodies of the UN, is due to 
the enormity of the UN voting database, this system requires a sound legalistic and 
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technical approach to gain access to the exact information required. The UN voting 
results per individual country is therefore not easily accessible due to this, and was 
found to be quite time consuming for a single researcher. Major resolutions passed in 
the UNGA or UNSC, are at times made available in the form of a “news brief” but do 
not explicitly state how each member voted. This is not sufficient in providing a 
convincing patter of voting on a particular issue. The Government Communication 
and Information Services of South Africa (GCIS), is the primary source in compiling 
this information as reference for South Africa, does not always make the information 
open to public scrutiny and is usually restricted as confidential. 
 
This thesis has also been delimited to certain themes which have constantly featured 
in South Africa’s foreign policy and have resonated at the United Nations. These 
themes include South Africa’s continued drive to promote the African/Global agenda 
through the New Economic Partnership on Africa’s Development (NEPAD); security 
and peacekeeping in Africa; the reform of the United Nations; and the issue of a 
permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. This thesis does not attempt to 
provide in-depth analysis of these issues, but rather highlights the main arguments of 
each as they are complex issues in their own right. So, for example, this thesis only 
mentions South Africa’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe at certain junctures in 
this study, in an attempt to display shortcomings in South Africa’s relationship and 
solidarity towards other African countries. The matter, however, is in every respect a 
larger issue that has challenged both South Africa’s foreign policy establishment as 
well as strained its relationships with its partners in the North at the United Nations.  
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1.7  THESIS OUTLINE 
The chapters in this thesis are structured around the research questions provided in 
Section 1.2. In order to understand post-Apartheid South Africa’s participation in the 
United Nations, Chapter 2 will provide a literature review to strengthen and deepen 
the theoretical concepts used in this thesis which are divided into two components. 
The first component provides a general (theoretical) overview of multilateralism as 
well as middlepowership (in particular the distinction between traditional and 
emerging middle powers). Chapter 3 looks specifically at South Africa’s foreign 
policy, offering an overview of trends in South Africa’s foreign policy. Chapter 4 
creates the context, outlining the various ways in which South Africa has been 
involved in the United Nations. A historical overview is sketched, briefly looking at 
the complexities that characterised the relationship between South Africa and the 
United Nations during the apartheid era compared to the increased activism since 
1994.  The chapter continues to identify and explore some of the central themes that 
have characterised South Africa’s connection to the world body. These include South 
Africa’s global development agenda and its so-termed African agenda through 
NEPAD; the issue of UN reform; and the question of South Africa’s seat at the United 
Nations Security Council.  To conclude, Chapter 5 provides a summary of the main 
arguments and presents a number of concluding remarks. Certain aspects worthy of 
future research are outlined.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
A WORLD OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
“… [countries], may not go as far as to surrender sovereign powers to international 
organisations, they do find them indispensable…New nations demonstrate this in their 
eagerness to be admitted to the UN…the big powers in the UN do not seem anxious to 
withdraw, and all countries find the organisation useful for sounding out ideas and 
for contact with other nations.”  
– A. Leroy  Bennett2 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
An interdependent system can be defined as a “tightly bound collection of units or 
actors whose behaviour affects one another directly or indirectly” (McGowan and 
Nel, 1999: 3); through the “regular, mutually accepted and mutually created patterns 
of relations” of international institutions that creates a mutual dependence between 
these actors (Murphy, 1999: 104). Usually these relations involve the coordination of 
policies concerning specific issues (commercial, security, social or environmental in 
nature) that affect all parties and can be undertaken by two states (bilaterally), or 
involve three or more states (multilaterally) (McGowan and Nel, 1999: 12). 
 
The term “international institution” can refer to conventions or treaties which set out 
rules of behaviour and cooperation between states regarding certain issues. For 
example, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the chief 
vehicle for efforts to prevent the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons. The term can 
also refer to formal international organisations which embody these institutions and 
serve to monitor and enforce rules through a secretary general and permanent staff. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is a perfect illustration of a 
successful multilateral alliance that has also become the most highly institutionalised, 
(Keohane, 1998: 82-83). Both of the above examples are multilateral in nature 
                                                 
2 Bennett, A.L. (1995).  International Organizations: Principles and Issues.  Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.  
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(organisational form), meaning that it engages more than three states on the basis of 
cooperation and reciprocity in achieving the same goals. International institutions are 
essentially created by the state to solve problems that they cannot solve on their own 
(Mitchell and Keilbach, 2001: 891). 
Academic scholarship analyzing the roles which international institutions play in the 
international system has a tendency to evolve as the dynamic of the system changes. 
In recent years insight has been gained into “what makes some institutions more 
capable than others - how such institutions best promote cooperation among states and 
what mechanics of bargaining they use […], and as the world moves toward new 
forms of global regulation and governance, the increasing impact of international 
institutions has raised new questions about how these institutions themselves are 
governed” (Keohane, 1998: 82).  
This chapter therefore intends to give a theoretical overview on the emergence of 
international institutions and intergovernmental organisations (IGO) as formal 
institution and aims to understand the role they play in the international system and 
also to understand why states would become members of such bodies. It also reviews 
the place of multilateralism in international relations, - inter alia, it provides a stage 
for states to exercise foreign policy and national interests in the international arena. 
This chapter looks at countries that are more inclined to pursue a multilateralist 
foreign policy within organisations, i.e. middle powers. The middle power concept is 
quite contentious as there are many factors that scholars have used to characterise 
countries based on material and power capabilities (enumerative) and foreign policy 
behaviour (constitutive). And as the international landscape is changing a further 
distinction is drawn between traditional middle powers and emerging powers.  
2.2 A GLOBAL SHIFT 
The terms, international institutions, regimes and organisations are used 
interchangeably in academic written work, even though a distinction can be drawn 
between them.  Institutions refer to sets of rules that regulate state behaviour and these 
rules may be formal and explicit, or informal and implicit (Keohane cited in Simmons 
and Martin, 2002: 194). Stephen Krasner (1983: 1) defines international regimes as 
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
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around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 
“Regimes often include formal organisations, but are not limited to them. Regimes are 
institutions in a broader sense: recognised patterns of practice that define the rules of 
the game” (Keohane and Nye, 1985: 151). International organisations are the formal 
embodiment of institutions, as they encompass a number of issue-specific regimes 
such as those for peacekeeping, development and the environment. Organisations also 
differ from regimes in that they are physical establishments (they have headquarters), 
employ civil servants and bureaucrats and have budgets and voting procedures 
(Simmons and Martin, 2002: 192-193), whereas regimes are usually ad-hoc forums or 
groupings (e.g. the G8). The phenomena of international institutions and regimes are 
not new; it just did not receive the attention it demands today.  
2.3  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
2.3.1 (NEO-)REALISM 
The two main assumptions of realist thought is that the international system is in 
anarchy as there is no overarching authority (world government) to prevent 
aggression, and the nation state is the main rational actor, promoting their national 
interests within the system (Walt, 1998: 31). “States prefer relative gains (i.e., doing 
better than other states) to absolute gains. They seek to protect their power and status 
and will resist even mutually beneficial cooperation if their partners are likely to 
benefit more than they are.” (Keohane, 1998: 88).  
 
While cooperation among self-interested actors is possible, formal institutions have 
been neglected. Neo-realists emphasise “cooperation under anarchy”, which focuses 
on decentralised cooperation without the presence of institutions (Oye, 1986: 5-6).  
According to realists, international institutions and organisations are “empty vessels” 
constructed only to “advance or impede state goals in the international economy, the 
environment and national security”, and foster cooperation in non-controversial areas 
where states have common interests (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal: 2001: 762). 
They therefore rarely constrain state behaviour in issue areas where interests are 
diverse and opposed. International organisations play little or no role in maintaining 
international peace and security, as “ciphers for state power” and lack independent 
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authority (Mearsheimer, 1995; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal: 2001: 762). As stated 
by Gilpin (1981:19): 
 
An international system is established for the same reasons that any political 
system is created; actors enter social relations and create social structures in 
order to advance particular sets of political, economic or other interests. 
Because the interests of some of the actors may conflict with those of other 
actors, the particular interests that are most favoured by the social arrangements 
tend to reflect the relative powers of the actors. 
 
2.3.2  (NEO-)LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
(Neo-)liberal institutionalists synthesise three elements: “a realistic respect for state 
power; an appreciation of the incentives that international independence creates for 
cooperation; and an understanding of how established institutions themselves affect 
states’ perceptions of their self-interest, by affecting the costs and benefits of 
alternative courses of action” (Keohane and Murphy, 1992: 882).  
 
Proponents of institutionalism continue to view states as the key actors in the 
international system, but acknowledge that they are not the only important actors and 
that states pursue their interests through institutions and/or regimes. They also tend to 
agree to disagree with neo-realism by accepting two of its fundamental principles 
which is the anarchic structure of the international system. (Neo-) liberal 
institutionalists however disagree on the degree of anarchic constraint and the rational 
egoism of states (utility maximising competitors) (Keohane, 1998: 83). Since states 
compete for resources and advantages in the international system, liberal 
institutionalists suggest that states are better off maximising their interests through 
cooperation, in that it does not matter how much the other party gets as long as they 
get something - “absolute gains, rather than relative gains” (Keohane, 1998:83-85). In 
addition, Keohane (1984: 72) argues that in rational-choice analysis, each actor is 
assumed to have calculated that it will be better off as a member of an international 
regime than outside of it. Moreover, rational-choice theory assumes that institutions 
can be accounted for by examining the incentives facing the actors who create and 
maintain them. 
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Institutions, regimes  and organisations therefore exist as enduring sets of norms, rules 
and expected patterns of behaviour and are neither epiphenomenal nor merely tools of 
the powerful (Strange, cited in Krasner, 1983:4-5). Institutions facilitate activities or 
“transaction costs” which in turn facilitate reciprocity that are beneficial to states and 
ease the risks of tricky negotiations (Keohane, 1998). In other words, institutions are 
formed as ways to overcome cases of ‘free-rider’ states (those that share benefits of 
cooperation without contributing to its costs) which undermine the legitimacy of 
cooperation for those who do meet the costs and ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ of relying on 
promises of cooperation in situations where enforcement is impossible. 
2.3.3  SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
A constructivist looks beyond the state and its power, and focuses more on the 
importance of ideas, identity and discourse. Through constructivist lenses states 
develop various identities to suit the international environment; one would be able to 
focus on how the state would identify itself in the new globalised era and “pay close 
attention to the prevailing discourse(s) in society because discourse reflects and 
shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted norms of behaviour” (Walt, 
1998: 41). 
 
Some of the basic premises of constructivism focuses on the co-dependence between 
social structures (that is, IOs) and agents (the state), and the rules which link the two. 
International norms are also formulated multilaterally within intergovernmental 
organisations which are also general principles of conduct for members to conform to. 
These norms are “formal [and] explicit, and legally binding rules” which are 
“embodied in such instruments as peace accords, treaties for settling disputes, and 
arms limitation agreements” as well in the founding documents of organisations such 
as the UN, NATO and the AU” (Geldenhuys, 2006: 94). Directly and indirectly, rules 
cause or produce certain behaviour, either by constraining actor choices and either by 
constraining actor choices or indirectly by defining roles and identity and providing 
reasons for acting in one way rather than the other (other (Ruggie, 1998: 13-16; 
Simmons and Martin, 2002: 198).  
 
For constructivists, international organisations and institutions do not exist only to 
improve the welfare of states. Constructivists expect and explain a much broader 
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range of impacts international organisations can have and specifically highlight their 
role in constructing actors, interests, and social purposes. According to constructivists, 
organisations are autonomous and have power and culture that govern behaviour and 
shape interests (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 700).  
 
Taking these perspectives into account, a more practical analysis of international 
institutions, it would be agreed that organisations and major institutions are structured 
according to the needs and advancement of its creator’s (the state) goals in the 
international economy, environment and national security (Koremenos, Lipson and 
Snidal, 2001: 762), Therefore institutions can either be global and have universal 
membership (UN) or regional and restrict membership to certain states and actors 
(e.g. SADC).  Some institutions may have no formal organisational structure, usually 
when considering bilateral treaties or regimes, however, states usually codify their 
relationships in formal legal arrangements. Voting procedures may also differ 
between, equal votes, weighted voting or supermajority voting and lastly, authority 
may be centralised and have significant operating responsibilities or provide platforms 
for open discussions (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001: 762).  
 
Most organisations function as disseminators of (government) information and 
research especially regarding transnational issues such as diseases, pollution, 
terrorism and so forth, in an attempt to encourage cooperation between governments 
as these issues are not easily dealt with unilaterally, therefore where “information 
reveals substantial shared interests, agreements may result” (Keohane and Nye, 1985: 
153). Organisation therefore function to lower the transactions costs by providing 
transparency and a framework of rules (Caporaso, 1993:63) 
 
The rise of globalisation3, in addition to the end of the Cold War, has increased the 
role of international institutions. Economic globalisation, for one, leads to a power 
shift from state to market, which is an important factor contributing to the emergence 
of global governance. Along with the globalisation of economies, other changes have 
become apparent. These include the surge of global social movements, the shrinking 
of political distances through the global operations of transnational corporations, in 
                                                 
3 Globalization is a summary term for the increasingly complex interactions between individuals, enterprises, institutions 
and markets across national borders 
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the vast increase in transboundary communication and information exchanges, most 
notably via the Internet; the transboundary transmission of disease and ecological 
impact; and the increased internationalisation of certain types of criminal activity; and 
the mushrooming of global interdependencies fostered by currency crises - all of 
which touch upon the subject of global governance (Report of the Secretary-General 
on the work of the Organisation, 1999).  
 
These centralising and decentralising dynamics have undermined the constitutions and 
treaties of national governments. Nevertheless, governments “still operate as 
sovereign powers in a number of ways, but some of their authority have been 
relocated toward sub-national collectivities” (Rosenau, 2000: 174). Globalisation has 
also brought benefits and risks that are distributed unequally. Furthermore, the growth 
and prosperity it provides for many is offset by the increasing vulnerability and 
marginalisation of others, and by the growth of "uncivil society" (Report of the 
Secretary-General on the work of the Organisation, 1999). 
 
With this rise of globalisation and global activity, states can no longer act in isolation 
and are dependent on each other. As the “new world order” was being ushered in, a 
multilateralist (interdependent) environment re-emerged, and cooperation among 
nations was the only reasonable solution to maintain peace and security in the new 
world system (Evans and Grant, 1995: 9).  Multilateral diplomacy has thus manifested 
itself within the foreign policies of many countries to facilitate cooperation between 
nations and may help one understand why states have certain foreign policy behaviour 
(Grant and Evans, 1995:10, Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen, 2001:9). These 
institutions determine what principles are acceptable as the basis for reducing 
conflicts and whether governmental actions are legitimate or illegitimate. The main 
aim is to encourage and facilitate cooperation amongst nations, but also not to 
encroach on the state’s interests (Keohane, 1998).  
2.4  MULTILATERALISM: THEORETICALLY DEFINED 
Caporaso (1993:51-53), purports  that “multilateralism” has been neglected in theories 
of international relations, not as a subject matter based on multilateral activities or 
organisation but as an explanatory concept. At this point one should distinguish 
between multilateral diplomacy, multilateral institutions and the institution of 
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multilateralism. According to Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen (2001: 9), the 
study of multilateral diplomacy of an actor should not only consider the involvement 
of the official state actors in the practices and institutions that facilitate cooperation 
between three or more state. The sum-total of a state’s involvement orientates itself 
towards and conducts itself with respect to the broader phenomenon of multilateralism 
as an institution. Caporaso (1993:54) draws the distinction between multilateral 
institutions, “characterized by permanent locations and postal addresses, distinct 
headquarters, and ongoing staffs and secretariats” (e.g. organisations), and the 
institution of multilateralism as manifesting itself within these physical organisations 
as the “less formal, less codified habits, practices, ideas and norms of international 
society.” 
 
As an activity within foreign policy, Robert Keohane (1990: 731) defined 
multilateralism as a “practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or 
mores states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions” (Keohane, 
1990:731).  Ruggie, however contends that Keohane’s definition is too nominal and 
formal, merely focussing on the number of participants, “coordinating the behaviour 
of states [or joint action by three or more nations] interacting with one another” 
(Ruggie, 1993: 12, Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen, 2000: 44, Holloway, 2000: 
362).  
 
A more substantive and qualitative definition of multilateralism is therefore proposed 
by Ruggie (1993: 11), as an “institutional form [including regimes and formal 
multilateral organisations] that coordinates relations among three or more states on the 
basis of generalised principles of conduct”. This definition focuses on the type of 
relations that are established between the actors in the institution. It is thereby a more 
normative perspective as actors have to abide by certain sets of rules or norms 
(Taylor, 2000: 22-23).  
 
Caporaso (1993: 55) reaffirms Ruggie’s conception of multilateralism as a recurrent 
pattern of cooperative behaviour whereby international actors organise their 
interactions according to their norms, or in other words an architectural form, or as a 
“deep organising principle of international life” based on three sets of norms; 
indivisibility, generalised principles of conduct and diffuse reciprocity. 
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As Caporaso (1993: 53-54) explains, 
 
 
 […] Indivisibility can be thought of as the scope (both geographic and 
functional) over which costs and benefits are spread […]Generalized principles 
of conduct usually come in the form of norms exhorting general if not universal 
modes of relating to other states, rather than differentiating relations case-by-
case on the basis of individual preferences, situational exigencies, or a prior 
particularistic grounds. Diffuse reciprocity adjusts the utilitarian lenses for the 
long view, emphasizing that actors expect to benefit in the long run and over 
many issues, rather than every time on every issue.
 
 
  
Phillip Nel (1998: 3), states that in an interdependent world stable orders are best 
promoted by applying “generalized principles of conduct…in a non-discriminatory 
way to all states that want to cooperate, without negating the individuality and 
autonomy of each actor; distributing the costs and benefits of interaction across the 
system (indivisibility); and developing incentives for actors to suspend the urge for 
instant gratification on every single issue and to recognise and pursue joint 
satisfaction on many issues (diffuse reciprocity)” (cited in Taylor and Williams, 
2006:2).  
2.4.1 MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS AS LEGITIMISING AND/OR   
DELIGITIMISING AGENTS 
Ruggie (1993: 24) links multilateralism to hegemonic stability theory and underlines 
the importance of judging the nature of the leadership provided by the hegemon. 
(Puchal, 2005: 572) defines hegemony as, “…a state of international affairs, a 
condition or situation in international relations. It arises when a single state attains 
preponderant power and elects to use its power to manage the international 
system….The hegemon enforces established rules by meting out rewards and 
punishments. It induces compliant behaviour by promising cooperation, co-opting 
partners, and providing collective goods up to the limits of its self-interest.”  
Therefore, a hegemon's behaviour helps to establish the norm of multilateralism. If 
this is true, then certainly its inverse must follow: consistent unilateral behaviour by 
the hegemon would seem to delegitimise the multilateralist order (Holloway, 2000: 
363-364) 
A similar link has been made by Robert Cox (1993), regarding multilateralism by 
making use of the Gramscian notion of hegemony. He argues that the essential 
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function of international institution is to justify, defend, and maintain the “hegemonic 
ideology” and its political-economic project (Cox, 1993: 62). Within this framework, 
the hegemon creates international institutions and develops “universal norms […] and 
mechanisms which lay down the rules of behaviour for states” (Taylor, 2000: 53) only 
to legitimise itself and the order. However, this normative regime may also 
delegitimise the hegemon and its position at certain “temporal” moments (Taylor, 
2000: 52).  
 
Since decolonisation and becoming members of equal stature (based on the notion of 
non-discrimination) in international organisations, states from the developing South 
have used techniques such as forming “blocs” to delimit the hegemonic order (Kahler, 
1992: 298). A well documented event of this leverage of power was in 1964 at the 
United Nations General Assembly, where the developing South temporarily 
‘”captured” the United Nations, and were able to build pressure leading to the 
founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
(Taylor, 2000: 54). Multilateral organisations are not simply agents of the hegemon or 
mere legitimisers of the accepted ‘standard of behaviour’ but can, at specific junctures 
in history, act to at least attempt to challenge the hegemonic discourse (Taylor, 2000: 
54).  
Prior to the development of hegemonic stability theory, a long-established attitude 
guided most realist/idealist debates about the development of multilateral institutions. 
Most realists accepted the idea that under conditions of anarchy a hierarchy of nations 
would emerge, ranking states by their power levels from great to minor powers. 
Greater power enabled greater capacity to act and to influence outcomes to the great 
power's liking. The desire to maximise the freedom to use their greater power made 
the top powers poor multilateralists (Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen, 2000: 44-
45).  
However, the interest of the small powers was to lessen their power disadvantage by 
binding the great powers to legal, alliance, and other multilateral institutions. Great 
powers relied on their own power advantage; minor powers relied on law and 
international organisation. Put simply, great powers tended to be unilateralist, small 
and medium powers multilateralist (Taylor, 2000). It is important to emphasise that 
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the United Nations is an organisation of just that -“nations” - and its eventual failure 
would only be due to the member nations not adhering to the principles of the 
organisation. 
2.5  MIDDLE POWERS 
Defining a middle power presents an “ambiguous, conceptual category in 
international politics” (Cooper, 1997). The concept of middle power was usually used 
within the Cold War context, based on security and power based on enumerative, 
aggregate, physical and material capabilities which helped differentiate between super 
powers and small powers. Realist scholars such as Holbraad (1984: 89-90) thus 
categorised middle powers according to their Gross Domestic Product (GDP), military 
capacity, geographic and population size and strategic location (Van der Westhuizen, 
1998: 437). 
However, in the post-Cold War era, using the ranking system based on economic, 
military and strategic factors alone are no longer as consistent and clear as in the late 
1980s and early 1990s after the Cold War, as one would end up with an “eclectic mix” 
of countries ranging from the developed North to the developing south, where a huge 
variance in actual foreign policy behaviour and interests can be identified (Hamill and 
Lee, 2001:34). The focus on security of the state has shifted to the security of the 
citizen with regards to economic and social insecurity. The global shift has seen the 
hegemony of the US decline and more emphasis on diplomatic activism by middle 
powers. A further distinction was therefore created within the middle power concept, 
which distinguishes between traditional and emerging middle powers, especially in 
the post-Cold War era, and will be discussed later in the chapter. 
A middle power can therefore, vaguely be defined as “manifestly not a great or even 
major power, nor however […] small or significant” (Evans and Grant, 1995:344), 
“occupying an intermediary position in the overall power structure of the international 
system” (Taylor, 2000) or “generally accepted as possessing a range of capabilities 
within the middle range of states” (Cox, 1996:244). Robert Cox (cited in Van der 
Westhuizen, 1998: 438) puts forth, that the middle power concept is not a fixed 
universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the 
changing state of the international system. Scholars have thus used a combination of 
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criteria based on capabilities and behavioural activities and even power capabilities of 
a state to provide a greater understanding and definition of its role in the international 
system.  
Hamill and Lee (2001), have therefore suggested that a country identified as a middle 
power, can be evaluated not only based on the traditional aggregate approach but also 
by focusing on behavioural attributes. Even though capabilities are taken into account, 
the behavioural approach asserts that “to be included in the category of 
middlepowership, countries have to act as middle powers” with regards to their 
foreign policy interests and foreign policy behaviour (Hamill and Lee, 2001: 34-35). 
Regardless of a country’s physical and material capabilities, it is the behaviour 
approach consisting of “non-structural factors” such as diplomatic skill, which enable 
middle powers to become important and often decisive players in international 
relations (Hamill and Lee, 2001: 35). 
From a liberalist point of view, Cooper, Higgot and Nossal (1993), have categorised 
middle power behaviour by the roles they play as catalysts, facilitators and managers. 
Whereas Nossal and Stubbs (1997) have focused on the scope, style, focus and forms 
and forums of middle power behaviour. This study will try to identify the overlapping 
criteria as discerned by the above academic analysis. 
 
As a catalyst, middle powers use their diplomatic skills such as intellectual leadership 
to trigger foreign policy initiatives. The scope and style of this behaviour thus 
includes being an activist and getting involved in a wide range of diplomatic matters, 
well beyond their concern.  Although they do get involved in every situation of 
conflict, they justify their activities of generating plans of actions as looking out in the 
interest of the international community (Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, 1993; Nossal and 
Stubbs, 1997). 
 
Middle powers always seem to be facilitating coalition-building initiatives on 
international and regional issues. The style of this behaviour includes the facilitation 
of collaborative action by “gathering support and ideas from as many likeminded 
states” to find solutions. These coalitions can be used as a means of leverage; 
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therefore leadership is considered a key technique (Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, 1993; 
Nossal and Stubb, 1997).  
 
The managerial inclination of middle powers can be illustrated in the building of 
institutions and regimes. It is the focus of middle powers to reduce conflict and 
develop confidence building (Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, 1993; Nossal and Stubbs, 
1997). Middle power countries prefer exerting influence on the multilateral level, 
carving out a “diplomatic niche.” International organisations are usually the structures 
of choice as middle powers have a better chance of building up consensus around 
certain issues in the presence of big or more powerful countries (Schoeman, 2003: 
351). These actions strengthen rule-based systems and therefore limit any unilateral 
actions by these bigger countries, and in turn allow the smaller states to “participate 
on an equal footing on the world stage” (Nzo, 1999 cited in Schoeman, 2003: 354).  
2.6  TRADITIONAL VERSUS EMERGING MIDDLE POWERS  
This study makes reference to the definition given by Jordaan (2003:165) describing 
middle powers as “states that are neither great nor small in terms of their international 
power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and 
stability in the world system” as well as his analysis which distinguishes between 
traditional and emerging middle powers. A combination of characteristics is 
considered in distinguishing between middle powers. These include: considerations of 
state capacity, position in the world order, the normative composition of the middle 
power, state-societal complex, domestic class interests, and the role and influence of 
foreign policy-makers (Jordaan, 2003:166). Taking the above analysis into account, 
most middle powers would display these behavioural attributes, however, there are 
differences in approach by countries further dividing middle powers into traditional 
and emerging powers.  
In earlier scholarship, only countries from the North were considered as middle 
powers, governments which were established and were economically and politically 
strong were usually associated with the foreign policy activities of the Scandinavian 
countries, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.  They fit the criteria mentioned in the 
above analysis in both material capabilities as well as foreign policy behaviour. 
According to Jordaan’s (2003: 172) study, most countries credited as traditional 
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middle powers were “old states” and within the international division of labour 
formed part of the core. They emerged during the Cold War; with regards to the roles 
they play in the international system. They played an activist role and secured their 
position by maintaining the balance of power and global security.  These powers 
therefore have an inclination to use multilateral bodies to pursue their aim of 
maintaining stability; not directly having their own self interest at heart but indirectly 
decisions made on a multilateral scale affects them as well. A middle power can not 
impose "an ideologically preconceived vision of an ideal world order, in the presence 
of big or superpowers” (Cox, 1996: 245). As Keohane (1969: 296) stated – “a middle 
power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but may be 
able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution. 
As established, stable democracies, they have an almost equal distribution of wealth, 
and enjoy the highest quality of life 
 
The emerging middle power concept is usually applied to countries of the south or 
from the (semi) periphery. South Africa, India and Brazil are considered to be 
“emerging.” Therefore, they have not reached the status yet, as these countries are 
part of the developing world (explaining the use of “emerging”, to go with 
“developing”), and they would seem to have a role somewhat different from 
established, developed middle powers (Schoeman, 2003: 349). Emerging middle 
powers have some leverage over the traditional powers, in that they are usually more 
dominant in their respective regions, economically and more influential within their 
regional organisation, and are often “keen participants and often initiators of regional 
cooperation and integration” (Jordaan, 2003: 173).   These regional powers however, 
do not necessarily gain the support and legitimacy to advance their greater foreign 
policy objectives from their regional partner countries. In the case of South Africa, for 
example, its ‘secondary powers,’ Zimbabwe and Nigeria have not really accepted its 
initiatives on the continent. Similarly, due to nuclear capabilities and other reasons 
Pakistan opposes India’s leadership and Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela 
undermines Brazil’s regional power status Argentina.  
 
Some middle powers hardly show any interest in aspiring to superpower status as they 
can make an impact in their current position. They are hegemonic legitimisers and 
aim to maintain orderliness and security in the world system.  Middle powers are 
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proud of being recognised as “good global citizens”, as they perceive to have an 
obligation to be policy entrepreneurs in pursuit of ethical outcomes in the 
international arena (Ravenhill, 1998; Jordaan, 2003: 173-178). 
 
 In his instructive analysis Hurrell (2000: 4) explains why middle powers use 
international institutions to assert their interests: 
 
Indeed sovereignty may be increasingly defined not by power to insulate one’s 
state from external influences but by the power to participate effectively in 
international institutions of all kinds. […] There is no great puzzle as to the 
advantages that often lead intermediate states to favor multilateralism and 
institutions […]: the degree to which institutions provide political space for 
important middle level players to build new coalitions in order to try and effect 
emerging norms in ways that are congruent with their interests and to 
counterbalance or deflect the preferences of the most powerful; and the extent to 
which institutions provide ‘voice opportunities’ to make known their interests 
and to bid for political support in the broader market place of ideas. So 
intermediate states will seek to use international institutions either to defend 
themselves against norms or rules or practices that adversely affect their interest 
or […] to change dominant international norms in ways that they would like to 
see. 
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2.7  SUMMARY 
“In world politics, the lack of a world government means that states must find ways to 
cooperate with one another through the use of reciprocity rather than hierarchy” 
(Keohane and Ostrom, 1995:1). This cooperation has come in the form of institutions, 
organisations and regimes.  
 
What is obvious in the above analysis is that international institutions, organisations 
and regimes are relevant in the current interdependent system; all the theoretical 
perspectives agree that these entities are creations of the state to further their own 
goals and design institutions accordingly, and that transactions costs are much lower 
when everyone is subject  to the same rules and norms. Even though realists may 
argue that international institutions only exist or are only as powerful as the states that 
created them allow them to be, there is a growing importance of these institutions 
maintaining world order (Keohane and Nye, 19981985: 148). One of the roles which 
institutions play is that of norm creators and entrepreneurs as well as information 
disseminators.   
 
Most of today’s interactions are multilateral in nature, within organisation or in 
regime creation, as a “deep organising principle” between more than three states 
conducting their recurrent patter of cooperation. Middle powers have the propensity to 
use multilateral institutions as vehicles for their interests as they are given a bigger 
platform to challenge the hegemon of the day but also to aspire to higher levels of 
representation with these bodies (Nel, van der Westhuizen and Taylor, 2000). 
 
One of the main arguments against multilateralism, in its most generic sense is one 
that supports the realist view that multilateralism is on the decline. This is best 
illustrated by the US’s contempt at unilaterally entering Iraq and Afghanistan in 
ostensible disregard of the rest of the world. However it does not provide any 
adequate answers as to why so many countries have continued to seek membership in 
multilateral organisations, especially the United Nations, and why middle powers like 
South Africa have committed themselves reforming the existing structures 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 SOUTH AFRICA REAWAKENS – POST-APARTHEID FOREIGN POLICY  
In this sense, the birth of a new South African nation, like the rebirth of our continent, 
has been a long time in the making. Indeed, it has been in progress from the 
beginning of the conquest. In reality resistance, and the aspiration towards 
independence regained, have never died, even when they seemed to have been 
silenced.                                                                                            
- President Nelson Mandela4 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The white minority government managed to isolate itself from the international 
community as a result of pursuing its oppressive domestic policy of apartheid, which 
denied full rights to the majority of its people. This abrasive policy was extended to 
the southern African region in the form of its destabilisation policy which eroded 
regional economic growth and development, bred poverty and corruption, causing 
resentment among neighbouring countries. 
In 1994, South Africa was heralded as the “beacon of hope” in Africa after Nelson 
Mandela was elected as the first black president of South Africa (The Star, 10 May 
1994). This election was regarded as the single most important event in the history of 
South Africa and Africa, due to the peaceful nature of its transition. In April 1999 
Thabo Mbeki succeeded and became the second democratically elected President of 
South Africa.  
During the tenure of both presidents, South Africa demonstrated its commitment to 
democratic governance and peaceful political change, and has become the most 
advanced democracy on the African continent. Compared to other African states who 
had acquired their freedom much earlier, South Africa’s industrial and economic 
development, along with its military capabilities, managed to break down the 
                                                 
4 Lecture by President Nelson Mandela at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies “Renewal and Renaissance – Towards a 
New World Order”, 11 July 1997 
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economic and political barriers which isolated the country from the rest of the world 
during apartheid. This has also encouraged the new government to aspire to both a 
position of regional political leadership and one of influence in international 
organisations.  
This chapter provides a brief comparative analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy 
during apartheid (1945-1990s) and in the post-apartheid period, over the last 15 years 
(1994-2007). Since SA foreign policy has many dimensions, only certain aspects are 
highlighted to get an overall picture of foreign policy orientation. A further 
comparison is drawn between Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) and Thabo Mbeki’s 
(1999-2007) approach to foreign policy., Although there were no fundamental 
changes to foreign policy principles, visible differences could be noticed with regards 
to each leader’s focus, strategy, style, and tactic.  
3.2  FOREIGN POLICY DEFINED 
Nel and Van der Westhuizen (2004:1) have observed that, “[f] oreign policy is usually 
conceived of as the sum total of the official plans and initiatives taken by a country 
with respect to its external environment, plus the values and attitudes that underlie 
these plans and initiatives.” 
 
As a working definition for this study, foreign policy can be defined as a set of 
principles and objectives informed by national interests that are pursued in an attempt 
to position a country in the international arena in order to protect and advance these 
interests. 
 
Governments therefore attempt to achieve national security, the promotion of political 
and economic autonomy, enhancing public welfare and status or prestige through its 
foreign policy (Vale and Mpaisha, 1999:98). The practice of foreign policy is based 
on setting objectives, intents and implementation. The scholarship of foreign policy is 
descriptive, analytical and evaluative. By looking at foreign policy decisions, policies 
and interactions between state and non-state actors this study is descriptive. It is 
analytical as it is informed by theory and the conscious adoption of a certain 
conceptual framework and evaluative as it involves the use and application of certain 
normative values, principles with which to judge foreign policy actions (Gerner, 
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1995:18). The study of foreign policy has thus been described as “somewhat 
unusual”, as it “deals with both domestic and international arenas, jumping from 
individual to state to systemic levels of analysis and attempts to integrate all of these 
aspects into a coherent whole” (Gerner, 1995:17) 
 
First generation analysis (1950s) focused on the state as the main actor in foreign 
policy, however after the Cold War (from the 1980s onwards), second generation 
traditions emerged and took into account multiple agendas and actors, on various 
levels of analysis (Mingst, 1995:230, 232). This tradition was multi-disciplinary, and 
looked at foreign policy as a process and not just as outcomes, where epistemologies 
and methodologies varied (Mingst 1995: 232). Foreign policy was no longer viewed 
as static or fixed but is always changing or shifting. 
 
There are a number of factors influencing the development and implementation of 
foreign policy.  A state’s domestic environment, which includes its economic and 
military capabilities, or perceptions thereof, along with interlinkages with friends and 
enemies greatly impact upon foreign policy development.  A plethora of non-state 
actors also influence foreign policies, actions, and intentions.  Such non-state actors 
include non-governmental organisations, inter-governmental organisations, and trans-
national corporations (Mingst, 1995: 234, Vale and Mphaisha, 1999:92).  Foreign 
policy is coloured by the way in which states interact with, adjust to, and react to such 
actors and the environment external to their borders.  Nonetheless, the protection and 
advancement of national interest is the driving force behind most foreign policies 
(Evans and Grant, 1995: 33). 
3.3  SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE APRIL 1994 
The Apartheid government’s foreign policy-making was described as an “oligarchic-
bureaucratic” process (Geldenhuys, 1984:2). Since 1948 foreign policy was 
ideologically driven by the domestic policy of racial discrimination (Hughes, 
2004:10) and was concentrated in the hands of the Prime Ministers (State President 
from 1984), the Foreign and Defence ministers and their senior officials, the military, 
and the intelligence agencies. Very little input was given by the white electorate, 
however pressure groups and certain government departments were asked to 
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contribute depending on the nature of the situation. Foreign policy also depicted a lot 
of the personality of the ruling President (Barber and Barratt, 1990: 3-4).  
 
In the years before the Second World War (WWII), South Africa had a good 
international standing, as it maintained strong links with Britain after independence 
and much of its international activities were conducted by General Jan Smuts, who 
himself was “experienced and esteemed” on the international political scene 
(Geldenhuys, 1984: 12). However, South Africa’s relations with the international 
community began to deteriorate by the end of World War Two, and received much 
condemnation especially from the United Nations for the country’s pursuance of 
discrimination and policies of “segregation” against the non-white population. 
International condemnation intensified when Apartheid was introduced as official 
policy in 1948, as membership within the United Nations was filled by newly 
independent African and Asian states. The anti-apartheid campaign spread vigorously, 
eventually isolating much of South Africa’s diplomatic activity. The country became 
a pariah within the international community when it was suspended from participating 
within the United Nations General Assembly and all other organisations. This 
diplomacy of isolation would last for four decades under the Afrikaner Nationalist 
regime (Geldenhuys, 1984: 12-13; Barber, 2004: 12; Spence, 2001b:3). 
 
At the height of the Cold War, the apartheid government’s foreign policy was 
characterised as reactionary and tentative  and placed its focus on bilateral relations, 
“as the sole means of surviving the international politics of exclusion”  (Nel, Taylor 
and Van der Westhuizen, 2001:111). The United States depended on South Africa’s 
strategic position in the region in its fight against the spread of communism in Africa, 
hence sacrificing the US’s own domestic policies against racial discrimination. In 
contrast, the British government sympathised with the National Party government 
amid the growing international anti-apartheid campaign and was not yet ready to 
sacrifice economic ties by implementing sanctions (Pillay, 1999; Hall, 1999). 
Exiled members of the African National Congress focused the organisation’s foreign 
relations on increasing this isolation by “publicising the injustices of apartheid” and 
pushed for sanctions, whilst also extending relations and forming political and 
ideological alliances with countries that supported the anti-apartheid cause. As 
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hostility or perceived “total onslaught” by pro-communist neighbouring countries 
increased against the South African apartheid regime, then state president P.W. Botha 
pursued a “totally national strategy” (1978-1989), which included the infamous 
regional “destabilization policy” and armed tactics (Barber, 2004: 20).  
It was argued that the security agenda which dominated foreign policy was an attempt 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) (and its autonomous subsidiary, the State 
Security Council) to defend its position regarding its internal policy of apartheid 
abroad, but also to defend itself against the external pressures of sanctions and other 
forms of intervention (Henwood, 1997; Spence, 2001a: 4). A state of “unstable 
equilibrium” became apparent due to periodic internal political unrest and constant 
badgering of public and private actors, “compounded by the ANC’s policy of 
deepening South Africa’s isolation carrying to the world the UN declaration that 
apartheid was a crime against humanity” (Alden and Le Pere, 2003: 11-12; Spence, 
2001b: 4).  
As the Cold War came to an end and the “new world order” was being ushered in, 
changes were taking place in South Africa as well. By 1989, F.W. de Klerk succeeded 
P.W. Botha as president. Apartheid, the “universal symbol of racism and unjust 
discrimination” was eventually dismantled after F.W. de Klerk made his “unbanning 
speech” at the opening of the South African parliament in 1990. This resulted in the 
release of Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC), and other anti-
apartheid movements (Henwood 1997; Barber, 2004).  
3.4  SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1994-1999 
The shift of powers within South Africa occurred concurrently with the shift of power 
in the global system (Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk, 1999:198). With an international 
system in flux, the new South African government required a new foreign policy and 
had to reengage with all actors concerned, as well as adapt to the new synergies of a 
globalised world. This was required if the ANC’s strategy for development and social 
progress were to be successful (Van Wyk, 2004: 103).  
 
For the South African government, its foreign policy therefore became an essential 
tool as an extension of its national policy and interests. The key element of the foreign 
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policy of President Nelson Mandela’s administration was the reconstruction of the 
country’s foreign policy but also establishing itself internationally (ANC Foreign 
Policy Document, 1996). The acceptance of South Africa back into the community of 
states necessitated increasing regionalisation in world politics, and the increasing 
importance of multilateralism in world affairs (Henwood, 1997). 
 
The current foreign policy has its foundation grounded in the principles or “pillars” 
which were laid out in Nelson Mandela’s article, “South Africa’s Future Foreign 
Policy” published in Foreign Affairs Journal (1993). Certain principles (pillars) may 
have taken preference over the other depending on the situation at the time, but all 
actions taken by the Department of Foreign Affairs since 1994 and government in 
general are underpinned by the following and aim to provide a coherent framework 
for its actions: 
• that issues of human rights are central to international relations and an 
understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, 
social and environmental; 
• that just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come 
through the promotion of democracy worldwide; 
• that considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the 
relations between nations; 
• that peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks 
down, internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective 
arms-control regimes, must be employed; 
• that the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in 
our foreign policy choices; and 
• that economic development depends on growing regional and international 
economic cooperation in an interdependent world  (Mandela, 1993:87) 
Besides the article written in Foreign Affairs by Nelson Mandela in 1993, outlining a 
future foreign policy for South Africa, the ANC had also drafted two papers, “Foreign 
Policy Perspective in a Democratic  South Africa” (1993, 1994) ”reflecting the “ANC 
View” on foreign relations (Barber, 2004:88). 
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3.4.1 GOOD INTENTIONS, GLOBAL EXPECTATIONS AND OUTPUT 
The democratic dispensation under the leadership of Nelson Mandela was primarily 
focused on imperative domestic issues by promoting nation-building projects such as 
consolidation of the peaceful transitional arrangements, constitutionalism and the 
reconciliation process, and Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) 
Monyae, 2004: 4). It also focused on the smooth re-entry of South Africa to the family 
of nations (Monyae, 2004: 4). As the then president noted, the irony of the country’s 
late entry into international affairs was that it could “reap the fruits of a world 
redefining itself” (Nelson Mandela, 1995).  
 
There was also a clear indication that South Africa was to be morally guided as a 
result of the ANC’s own struggle for human dignity and equality during apartheid, 
and much of the international activities South Africa participated in were a result of 
(usually arbitrary) decisions made by the President (Barber, 2004:87). Promoting 
human rights became his guiding light but often contradicted its wider foreign policy. 
South African foreign policy from 1994 to early 1996 was thus labelled the “The 
South African Miracle”, as it was personified by Nelson Mandela’s iconic 
international personality (Van Wyk, 2004: 108).  
 
The most common examples of Mandela’s human rights activities but also 
contradictions include South Africa’s stance on the two China’s (PRC) ordeal and the 
1995 Nigerian Human rights issue. South Africa’s position on the China/Taiwan 
episode, was that of balancing its domestic economic interests and needs with regards 
to China’s overwhelmingly speedy emergence as a political and economic super 
power (Schraeder, 2001:237) and its role as a “global moral crusader for human 
rights” (Van Wyk, 2004: 118; Bischoff, 1998:203-205). Taiwan was recognised by 
the previous government as an independent state and had also forged close relations 
with the ANC after 1990. However, despite China’s atrocious human rights record, 
the Asian giant supported the liberation movement economically, so the new 
government was indebted, but it is also China’s (PRC) permanent seat on the Security 
Council that motivated the new government to rather establish formal diplomatic 
relations with the PRC (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 208-211). 
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South Africa’s leaders have always acknowledged that its future was dependent on the 
stability and development of the African continent as a whole, as President Mandela 
(1993: 89), asserted, "South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not 
devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have 
brought ruin to its various parts." The new democracy was viewed as “The Beacon of 
Hope” within the southern-African region and the continent of Africa as a whole (The 
Star, 10 May 1994).  The developed nations of the North, especially the United States, 
expected South Africa to accept the role as a “pivotal” state, which is described as a 
state that “is so important regionally that its collapse would spell trans-boundary 
mayhem…A pivotal state’s progress and stability, on the other hand would bolster its 
regions economic vitality and political soundness” (Le Pere, 1998: 1). South Africa as 
a resource rich, middle-income stable democracy was best positioned to influence its 
neighbours through broad economic and political linkages (Schoeman, 2003: 354).  
 
The country’s economy is highly diversified and technologically advanced, and 
capable of generating substantial amounts of investment capital, it dwarfs other 
African states (Van der Westhuizen, 1998: 436). The foundation of the economy is an 
industrial infrastructure with manufacturing industries. The economies of many 
Southern African states are dependent on South Africa's transportation system, 
particularly its rail network and port facilities. South Africa is one of world’s and 
Africa’s leading producer of a variety of strategic and industrial minerals, due to its 
vast mineral reserves (Barber, 2004: 178-180). Under apartheid South Africa was the 
dominant military power in Africa, and it remains potentially so today, and therefore 
an expectation that South Africa would emerge as a “continental peacemaker and 
keeper” (Barber, 2004: 85). The technological basis for South Africa's military 
superiority over other regional actors is a well-developed military-technical base 
whose capabilities far exceed those of any other African state (Van der Westhuizen, 
1998:436). 
 
However, leaders of African countries have perceived South Africa’s position to be 
that of a hegemon, who has aspired leadership based on its political, economic and 
military strength. The country was regarded as a bully, causing havoc within the 
region, and therefore caused distrust amongst its neighbours (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 
90). The South African government was wary and tried not to exert itself as hegemon 
   35
but as an equal. Nevertheless, the country’s “heavy-handed” intervention in Lesotho 
in 1998 contradicted this position, as well as its stated preference for conflict 
resolution and peaceful settlement of disputes. The “Nigerian folly” was also a cause 
of much embarrassment to both Nelson Mandela and the country as a whole. This was 
a case in reverse where its promotion of human rights turned into a loss of face 
amongst its African counterparts. President Mandela’s strong stance and attempt to 
get support for strong action against the Nigerian regime after the hanging of political 
dissidents saw South Africa move away from African solidarity and siding with 
London and Washington (Hamill and Lee, 2001: 38).  
 
Foreign policy stances on disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and arms control 
under President Nelson Mandela were regarded as a “policy of moral multilateralism 
and global norm entrepreneurship” (Vickers, 2002: 81; Van Wyk, 2004: 118).  “[T]he 
debates on South Africa’s commitment to human rights, its allegedly Pro-western 
stance and accusations that foreign policy making is not sufficiently democratic, 
reflect the division between the internationalists wishing to advance human rights 
versus the mercantilists who tend to put economic necessity before anything else” 
(Van der Westhuizen, 1998:448). 
“A central dimension of South Africa’s normative role has been its promotion of 
rules-based multilateralism as the appropriate institutional form for conducting 
international affairs in what Mandela called an interdependent world” (Nel and 
Carlsnaes, 2006: 21). South African foreign policy-makers were trying to be as active 
as possible within international affairs, and take advantage of the international lime-
light of the moral victory over apartheid. South Africa’s activities were “premised 
upon the belief in the compatibility of human rights, solidarity politics and the 
country’s own development needs” (Alden and Le Pere, 2003:11-12). 
 
The channel in promoting these principles and one of the key aspects of the new 
South Africa’s foreign policy was its immediate acceptance into the international 
arena. South Africa’s representation abroad exploded and from May to December 
1994, South Africa acceded to 16 multilateral organisations, including the United 
Nations (UN), The Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union), The Non-Aligned 
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Movement, and the Commonwealth. The South African government had also acceded 
to about 70 multilateral treaties and joined or rejoined more than 40 inter-
governmental institutions (Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen, 2000:1). 
 
The foreign policy also reflected “universalism” in which the government tried to  
“de-ideologise” foreign policy, in order to establish relations with actors without 
implying support for domestic and international affairs (Van Wyk, 2004: 116).  This 
leitmotif of “universality” or “universalism” governing South Africa’s foreign policy 
was essentially the opening of South Africa’s diplomatic doors to any state that would 
care to accept the former pariah (Mills, 1997).  “It was to reflect the same 
reconciliatory spirit that characterised its own domestic transformation. The noble 
intentions and the affirmation of certain values in its foreign policy notwithstanding, 
their realisation and implementation in practice has proven to be an ongoing dilemma 
and a vexing problem” (Le Pere, 2004:4). 
 
The country intended to use its strong relations with the North and solidarity with the 
South and to be a bridge between the two for greater cooperation with regards to 
global issues. It therefore maintained and cemented its relations with countries 
formerly known for their animosity towards Pretoria during apartheid. Most of these 
countries were in Africa, which included the “pariah” Libya, but also countries from 
the rest of the developing world - Iran, Syria, and Cuba (Evans, 1999: 623; Schraeder, 
2001: 234). Relations with some of these countries have at the best of times put strain 
on South Africa relations with its Western counterparts as they are also countries who 
have no embraced the neo-liberal economic policies  and democratic governance 
promoted by the North (Henwood, 1997). 
 
South Africa’s clean slate was advantageous as it could adapt easily to the changes 
occurring in the international arena, however, it was apparent that the country’s 
officials were taking on too much too soon, and its international activities ended up in 
contradiction and incoherence. This was essentially true when foreign policy was 
based on public statements made by Nelson Mandela, instead of his statements 
reflecting a consensus opinion. Other factors which exacerbated the “lack of 
coordinated vision” in South African post-apartheid foreign policy, was the 
multiplicity of actors in foreign policy-making and issues which included 
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globalisation, global financial markets, regional and economic blocs, international 
trade linkages and multilateral governance (Alden and Le Perle, 2003: 15). 
 
According to the South African Constitution (1996: Chapter 5), the President as Head 
of State and of the National Executive is responsible for receiving and recognising 
foreign diplomats, and appointing diplomatic representatives. Together with the 
cabinet, he also has executive authority to develop and implement national policy, 
prepare and initiate legislation, and coordinate the functions of all government 
departments. The main inadequacies were found within the implementation 
machinery, in this instance formulating and implementing foreign policy. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), as an instrument of government did not have 
the resources, experience and skills behind them to deal with old and new issues, 
especially with regards to multilateral engagements (Alden and Le Pere, 2003: 16-17).  
 
As the main authority managing South Africa’s foreign relations, the DFA was 
debilitated by the internal divisions which existed between the apartheid ‘old-order’ 
officials and the new cadres from the liberation movements. The new regime 
considered to “break free from the diplomacy of isolation” and start gaining 
confidence from its neighbouring countries and solidifying its solidarity with both the 
developing world and Africa as a whole (Alden and Le Pere, 2003: 14).  
 
“Inheriting and restructuring the Department of Foreign Affairs from the ancien 
regime  proved to be a greater task than the new government had initially expected” 
(Van der Westhuizen, 1998: 444).  It was imperative to create a common vision for 
the department, in order to execute a more coherent foreign policy. Yet, the highly 
educated, skilled and experienced staff undertook primary roles in the multilateral 
sector and senior posts abroad, which left the department with minimal experience to 
draw from. In an attempt to make the department more representative with respect to 
race, gender and ideology, the new government also wanted to integrate diplomats 
from the old homeland sector who staffed the ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress 
(PAC)5 missions in exile. This caused a contradiction in decision-making processes 
not only because these diplomats had fewer skills but also brought along other 
                                                 
5 The PAC was a liberation movement in South Africa created in 1959, by the more radical and Africanist proponents of 
the ANC. 
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“ideological baggage” (Mills, 1997; Alden and le Perle, 2003:14; Hamill and Lee, 
2001: 39).  
 
Furthermore, a lack of communication and uniformity between departments existed 
between two of the more important departments assisting in South Africa’s 
positioning within international relations, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
and the Department of Foreign Affairs, as the former handled most of South Africa’s 
bilateral and multilateral trade diplomacy, where its decisions would contradict and 
conflict with that of the wider foreign policy. Parliament which serves as the 
mouthpiece for the public and public watchdog and civil society which included a 
host of non-state actors (trade unions, human rights groups, academic think-tanks etc.) 
all presented opinions and inputs aimed at influencing foreign policy (Schraeder, 
2001: 236-237; Alden and le Perle, 2003: 16-17). 
 
And lastly, and probably the most criticised element of foreign policy, was the 
leadership of the reforming DFA.  The late Alfred Nzo, the first Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and stalwart of the ANC, was not often praised for his performance and pro-
active policies and was viewed as “lacking in dynamism and vision” (Nathan, 2005: 
361). With these structural and bureaucratic discrepancies, the post-apartheid foreign 
policy has come a long way to develop conceptual coherence, strategic direction and 
purpose. It also allows one to understand the chaos under which the department had to 
operate in getting South Africa functioning as a member of the international 
community internationally. 
 
3.4.2 THE 1996 DISCUSSION PAPER 
In an attempt to delineate South Africa’s foreign policy goals and actions more 
clearly, the Department of Foreign Affairs in consultation with other government 
departments which included the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, Portfolio 
Committee on Trade and Industry, Public Enterprises and Foreign Affairs of the 
Senate drew up a document (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996). The aptly called 
“Discussion paper”, consisted of a melange of accumulated updated policy papers and 
workshops on specific issues and therefore could by no means be expected to be a 
“fine tuned” foreign policy document. It had allowed interested parties an opportunity 
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to debate conflicting issues and participate in forging a new approach to foreign 
policy formulation (Henwood, 1997).  
 
The paper considered South Africa’s position as a respected “world citizen” in the 
international community, as well as the challenges it would face reengaging with the 
new world order and embracing globalisation and technological advancement. It 
maintained its initial pillars concerning the advancement of human rights and the 
promotion of democracy, and intention to support multilateral relations within smaller 
regimes and especially organisations such as the United Nations and all its agencies. It 
also aimed to “secure worldwide peace, promote disarmament, prevent genocide, 
restrict proliferation of nuclear arms of mass destruction and to achieve a new world 
security regime” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996).  
 
The paper received a lot of criticism not because of its intent, but at the highly 
ambitious “pillars, cornerstones, principles and priorities” set out for South African 
foreign policy and the country’s perceived role in its international activities. Greg 
Mills (1997), called the document an “ambitious, but misguided wish list for South 
African foreign policy”, which undervalued the country’s resources and capacity to 
act, which was ironic since the paper states  at the beginning that “South Africa’s 
policy initiatives should be modest and not overly ambitious” (Department of Foreign 
Affairs, 1996, Mills, 1997). This programme, according to Barber (2004: 118), failed 
to identify priorities and read like “minutes of a committee” in which all views had 
been recorded without distinguishing between them. 
 
At the time it was doubtful whether the South African government would be able to 
live up to all of those expectations, yet it presented an opportunity to expose the 
shortcomings and divergent views regarding its foreign policy. The Discussion 
document remained a green paper, and has not been ratified as official policy or white 
paper. Its pillars, intentions and goals have been transferred to the succeeding 
government and have given its foreign policy direction.  
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3.4.3 PRESIDENT IN WAITING 
Thabo Mbeki was the natural choice to succeed Nelson Mandela as the next president 
of the Republic of South Africa, although there were certain political realities that 
restricted his political influence in vying for the position (Hamill, 1999). Mbeki’s 
political career was based on dealing with international affairs, contributing greatly to 
the ANC’s foreign policy drafting during apartheid and in the post-apartheid 
Government of National Unity (GNU) as deputy-president. Constitutionally, the 
deputy-president position was filled by two persons, Thabo Mbeki and F.W. de Klerk, 
and their roles were restricted to the duties set assigned to them by the President and 
were usually matters that the President could not attend to himself (Barber, 2004). 
Even though De Klerk led caucuses within the National Assembly, he was however, 
never invited to serve as acting president in the absence of Nelson Mandela, as “that 
honour was reserved for Mbeki” (Hamill, 1999).  
After, the National Party had severed ties with the GNU in 1996, which dissolved the 
second deputy-president position, Thabo Mbeki was allowed more space to 
manoeuvre, and at the same time Nelson Mandela started to withdraw from the day to 
day business of government, handing the responsibility over to Mbeki (Barber, 
2004:87). As de facto President, he strengthened the role of the deputy-president’s 
office, creating a special unit which allowed him to directly influence government’s 
political and economic policies and to attend to the inadequacies of the government’s 
performance. “The department became the control room for all the functions of 
government, providing greater policy direction, guaranteed interdepartmental co-
ordination, and more effectively evaluate the performance of individual departments” 
(Hamill, 1999).   
Mbeki’s reformist tendencies started at home with his influence over the domestic 
neo-liberal, market friendly, economic policy - The Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) as well as his promotion of the “African Destiny” in politics, 
economics and culture, and a constructive partnership with the West, principally the 
U.S., as the most appropriate means of achieving that goal (Evans, 1999: 625). His 
reconstructive influence continued within the ANC itself, after he was elected two 
years prematurely as president of the ANC in December 1997, even though  Mandela 
remained State President until 1999 (Hamill, 1999). 
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3.5  SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1999-2007 
Foreign policy and engaging in international affairs  was nothing new for Thabo 
Mbeki as he was instrumental in the ANC’s fight against apartheid in the international 
arena, addressing the United Nations more than once notably during the Rivonia 
Trials, calling on the international community to assist in the fight against the racist 
white government. He also assisted in chartering the party’s foreign policy and served 
as Oliver Thambo’s (then ANC president) advisor on foreign policy between 1971 
and the early 1990’s. Thabo Mbeki led the efforts to raise the ANC’s profile and 
standing both in Africa and abroad (Landsberg and Hlophe, 1999).  
 
With this history of experience and also cognisant of the inconsistencies within 
previous foreign policy, President Mbeki attempted to consolidate both the foreign 
policy machinery and its foreign relations (Alden and Le Pere, 2003: 27). “Our 
starting point was the acceptance of the basic reality that foreign policy is a reflection 
of our domestic policy, and its major objective is to protect our national interests… 
Today the most important challenge facing us is the consolidation, deepening and 
strengthening of our non-racial and non-sexist democracy. To meet our objectives we 
must ensure that South Africa achieves sustainable economic development and 
prosperity which is people centred” (Pahad, 2000). 
 
Even though South Africa was an economic giant on the African continent, forming 
part of the semi-periphery in the world economy (middle-income) and maintaining a 
medium human development ranking on the United Nations Development 
Programmes index, the president was still concerned with the domestic development 
challenges. The tensions between economic reforms such as privatisation on the one 
hand and alleviating poverty and job creation on the other remained just two of the 
many transitional difficulties the democracy still battled with (Bischoff, 2003, Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2004: 91). A highly unequal domestic distribution of wealth between rich 
white minority and poor black majority causes South Africa to have inequality which 
is of the highest in the world (UNDP, 2003). 
  
Thabo Mbeki’s role in international relations has been described as liberal and 
universal and his policy approach as pragmatic and reformist motivated by his neo-
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pan-Africanism ideology (Olivier, 2003: 816). Hence, it was imperative to include its 
neighbours in building up Africa’s capacity economically and politically to have 
strategic advantage in the globalised arena, as both South Africa and Africa reflected 
the same characteristics of poverty and inequality (Landsberg, 2005: 723). The new 
administration emphasised the importance of multilateral engagements with the 
industrial north and aimed to strengthen its relations with the developing South as a 
platform to address both the domestic and continental condition. South Africa’s 
multilateral orientation achieved under the Mandela presidency continued under 
Mbeki but with greater thrust, launching his reformist multilateral drive to “counter 
the marginalisation of African in the global economy, and to effect some global 
reforms that […] will benefit developing countries” (Nel, Taylor and Van der 
Westhuizen, 2001: 9). 
 
President Mbeki summarised his “Global initiative” in his presidential budget vote 
speech in the National Assembly, 13 June 2000 as: 
 
At the centre of all the engagements I have mentioned is the critical question of 
our time, of how humanity should respond to the irreversible process of 
globalisation while addressing the fundamental challenges that face the bulk of 
humanity. These include poverty, underdevelopment, the growing North-South 
gap, racism and xenophobia, gender discrimination, ill health, violent conflicts 
and the threat to the environment. These problems cannot be solved except in 
the context of the global human society to which we belong. We must and will 
continue actively to engage the rest of the world to make whatever contribution 
we can to ensure that the process of globalisation impacts positively on those, 
like the millions of our people, who are poor and in dire need of a better life. 
This engagement must necessarily address among things the restructuring of the 
UN, including the Security Council, a review of the functioning of such bodies 
as the IMF and the World Bank, the determination of agenda and the manner of 
operation of the WTO and an assessment of the role of the G7. Central to these 
processes must be the objective of reversing the marginalisation of Africa and 
the rest of the South, and therefore compensation for the reduction of national 
sovereignty by increasing the capacity of the South to impact on the system of 
global governance. 
 
3.5.1 THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE 
The African Renaissance propagated by Thabo Mbeki since 1997, emerged as the 
defining foreign policy concept of the administration (Schraeder, 2001: 233). It is not 
a new concept but an ideal which Pan-Africanists envisioned as the renewal and 
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establishment of a United States of Africa, free from colonialism, apartheid and 
racism (Landsberg and Hlope, 1999: 3). Conversely, the African Renaissance pursued 
by the new government, was an attempt to counter the afro-pessimism that existed 
within and outside of African towards South Africa, and to promote South Africa as 
an African equal and not as a hegemon in finding African solutions for Africa (Evans, 
1999:626; Landsberg and Hlope 1999: 12).   
 
The consolidation and deepening of democracy was the main tenet of the African 
Renaissance, under which all of its other goals, such as peace and stability, economic 
vibrancy, education and the self assertion of Africans through cultural, traditional, 
spiritual, linguistic and so forth would follow. As Thabo Mbeki (1998) affirmed, “the 
region needs a radical expansion of the frontiers of democratic participation if it is to 
tap the initiative and intellect of its citizens, limit any tendency towards arbitrary rule 
and accelerate the integration of their regional economy into the economy of the 
world.” He further stated that the southern African region should “transform itself into 
a zone of peace, building stable democratic systems, position itself productively to 
exploit its considerable human and natural resources, organising itself to make a 
contribution to the challenge of peace, democracy, development and stability in the 
rest of our continent.”  
The African Renaissance has encompassed South Africa’s foreign policy, as a process 
which would inform the every day business of foreign policy to bring about 
transformation internationally and within South Africa itself,  “in essence, is a part of 
the broader struggle to achieve a just and new equitable world order” (Pahad, 2000). 
The role which South Africa was envisaged to play was that of a “bridgehead” of 
development in the region (Landsberg and Hlope, 1999; Schraeder, 2001: 233). At her 
first budget vote speech as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
(2000) declared, that the agenda of the African century for the African Renaissance 
would inform the programmes of the Ministry during her term of office and that, the 
policy and programme will rest on four broad pillars, which were development, peace 
and security, governance; and transformation of the related institutions. 
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3.5.2 FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MAKING – THE EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY-
MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION MACHINERY 
Thabo Mbeki made changes to the existing bureaucratic and policy-making 
machinery, by reconciling South African diplomacy with its domestic policies in 
order to make the implementation of his new “African Renaissance” and global 
reform a smoother process (Alden and Le Pere, 2003: 27). By securing greater 
political control within the ANC, Thabo Mbeki had set off with a team of colleagues 
to “reshape the contours” of foreign policy and replace it with a “stronger sense of 
purpose and vision” (Alden and Le Pere, 2004:287).  
 
President Thabo Mbeki, in addressing the opening of the ANC National Policy 
Conference in September 2002, said: 
 
We can state without any fear of contradiction, that in less than one decade, we 
have transformed our country from being an international pariah, a negative 
force in favour of racism globally, reaction, destabilisation, aggression and war, 
to an important international player, for democracy, social progress, national 
independence and equality, and peace. 
 
3.5.3 THE CHIKANE REPORT (2001) 
By setting up the Presidential Review Commission, President Mbeki planned to create 
integrated policy-making machinery. By 2001, the “Integrated democratic 
governance: a restructured presidency at work”, or simply  the “Chikane report” was  
presented by the Director-General in the Presidency, Rev. Frank Chikane  (Hughes, 
2004: 16, Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 129).  
 
This report included several changes to be made to the national policy-making and 
administrative bodies and the main restructuring was to be that of the presidency (Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2006: 43) which would also be the locus of foreign policy formulation 
and decision–making. The presidency with a staff of 341 functioning as a cabinet 
office was committed to the “efficient and effective executive management of 
government by the president, together with the deputy president and cabinet…” 
(Chikane, 2001:7). Policy-making was starting to become more centralised, as the 
president, deputy president and minister without portfolio were brought together 
under the same office, and was served by the same integrated administrative unit 
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managed by one Director-general (DG) (van Nieuwkerk, 2006:43, Le Pere and Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2004: 129).  
 
Resembling a clustered system of governance, the presidency was supported by six 
cabinet committees responsible for the social, economic, investment and employment, 
international relations, peace and security, justice, crime prevention and security; and 
the governance and administration sectors. This overhaul was to ensure a more 
coordinated working environment for all the various state actors, making the 
presidency the main policy making body (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 129).  
 
In addition to the restructuring of the entire policy making structure and integrating 
the external and internal civil servants of the foreign affairs department (external and 
internal civil servants), government also managed to map out the service delivery 
commitments of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), under the supervision of 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The document outlines the role, values and objectives 
of the department for the set financial year, identifying medium term goals, in the 
context of its mission statement of promoting and protecting South Africa’s national 
interests and values, promoting the African Renaissance and creating a better life for 
all (Ntsaluba, 2005: 13). 
3.5.4 THE STRATEGIC PLAN IN ACTION – THE AFRICA AGENDA AND 
NORTH/SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION 
The Department of Foreign Affair’s Strategic Plan for the periods 2005-2008 and 
2006-2009 reflected a more developmental approach to its foreign relations, greatly 
emphasising the government’s commitment to its African Agenda, consolidating the 
African Renaissance as well as strengthening its South-South cooperation, guided by 
a vision of “a better South Africa in a better Africa and a better World, that is, a better 
life for all.” 
 
With the future of South Africa inextricably linked to that of Africa and the Global 
South6, multilateral initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 
                                                 
6  The “global South” is crucial to world politics and global governance. This group contains rising 
great powers and major centers of economic growth; many urgent security issues facing both developed 
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the African Union (AU), Pan African Parliament (PAP), African Peace and Security 
Council (APSC) and SADC were prioritised to drive regional cooperation, integration 
and leadership aspiration in order to transform the African environment (Alden and 
Le Pere, 2004:287). Strategically, South Africa strengthened its effort as part of the 
South-South Co-operation, as an initiative by the developing countries of the South to 
work in solidarity to address the challenges of marginalisation as a result of 
globalisation that is biased towards countries of the north (Dlamini Zuma, 2005). Its 
relations have manifested in the formation of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue 
Forum (IBSA), which serves to influence global power relations by working towards 
the linking of their economies and people. Africa and Asia partnership have been 
formalised to encourage business links, but also exchange of visits by journalists to 
improve understanding of each other's societies and MERCOSUR and strengthening 
of relations with South America and the African diaspora of the Caribbean 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006).  
 
These groupings of the South have managed to be extremely instrumental within the 
global arena however, and have always taken on a more antagonist relationship with 
the North, in effect, countries from the North and South rarely engaged in genuine 
dialogue and consensus building on development within the poorer countries and to 
address global economic and social imbalances. The new South Africa, as a middle 
power had established relationships with the main powers in the North and the South 
and as a bridge builder, the SA government has been able to involve the G8 in 
supporting many of its developmental projects as well as the North consisting of the 
more powerful developed nations with regards to resources and financial assistance 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2007). 
As Thabo Mbeki reaffirmed in his speech as chair of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(1999): 
it is vital that the NAM and the Group of 77 plus China should have a common, 
coordinated and strategic approach in their interactions with organisations of the 
North such as the G8 and European Union. We must ensure that the benefits of 
the twin processes of globalisation and liberalisation accrue to all of our 
                                                                                                                                            
and developing states; population problems and solutions; significant threats to global health; and 
development approaches that will profoundly affect the global environment 
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countries and peoples and that its potential threats and risks are accordingly 
mitigated… 
 
3.6 SUMMARY 
The Mandela and Mbeki governments had respectively been expected to play a 
pivotal role within the continent of Africa. Some academics have argued the reason 
for this responsibility from the North, is to relieve them from carrying the continent 
on its back, and therefore passing the buck to South Africa. Both administrations 
however, have accepted this charge and have applied themselves and their various 
departments through various strategies in stabilising the continent and preparing it to 
take control of its own destiny. A more moral thrust through the promotion of human 
rights and respect of international law was the approach neglected by Nelson 
Mandela. Even though not always successful, his moral standing had personified the 
government’s actions and therefore gave its call for an equal and reformed global 
system more substance.  
 
However, more substantial engagement has been pursued my President Thabo Mbeki, 
through his pragmatic and reformist approach within foreign policy (Nel, 2006: 115). 
The African Renaissance has been the motivation to play a constructive and dynamic 
role in developing and highlighting the continent’s plight, not as a hegemon but as a 
partner of like-minded African leaders. The Africa Agenda and NEPAD have now 
taken precedence in the South African government’s greater foreign policy of 
strengthening multilateralism regionally, continentally and globally, as well as to 
cultivate a leadership position in multilateral institutions that is designed both to 
influence policy outcomes in these bodies and to reform their structure and process in 
favour of the needs of developing countries. “On a rhetorical level the United Nations 
and the values that underlie it (such as cooperation) proves strategically useful for the 
international orientation and goals of the government” (Cornelissen, 2006:29).  
As a bridge builder, South Africa and Africa form part of the global village and the 
country’s development cannot be achieved in isolation. “More generally, South Africa 
promotes multilateralism in the international system as the best means of maintaining 
global order, addressing global problems, mitigating the domination and unilateralism 
of powerful states, and empowering weaker countries” (Nathan, 2005: 365) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
“It is my belief and that of our government that our task is to change ourselves and 
the world and to do so for the sake of developing countries and for the poor of the 
world, to work towards a more humane and inclusive approach to the world which 
really encompasses global governance in the spheres of world politics, economics and 
culture…. A more egalitarian society”  
 - Van der Merwe7 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
The first part of the chapter reviews South Africa’s historical ties and participation in 
the United Nations during apartheid and post-apartheid.  During apartheid, the United 
Nations played a pivotal role in isolating the white South African government from 
the international community, condemning apartheid as a crime against humanity and 
eventually relegating the country to pariah status. In 1994, then UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali welcomed South Africa back into the world community. The 
new South Africa displayed its orientation towards being a good global citizen and 
moral voice within Africa and of the developing world, which has manifested in 
hosting major United Nations conferences and heading certain bodies within the 
United Nations. This chapter will focus on South Africa’s chairmanship of the 
UNCTAD (IX), and three important conferences, the UN AIDS conference, the UN 
World Conference against Racism, Xenophobia and Related Discrimination (WCAR) 
and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). 
In its leadership capacity within these forums South Africa, along with its partners of 
the South have emphasised the inequalities which exist due to globalisation between 
                                                 
7 Honourable Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, Ms Sue van der Merwe, to Senior Students at Fuller 
Hall. University of Cape Town, Cape Town, 11 August 2005 
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the developed North and developing South, and have therefore called for the reform 
of the global system to a rules-based democratic global order. 
 This second part of the chapter has been divided into two main areas or themes of 
discussion. The first theme focuses on the Global Development Agenda and Africa, 
where South Africa has used its leverage as the moral voice for the developing world 
within the United Nations to draw attention to the plight of Africa, the developing 
world’s increasing poverty, and the increasing marginalisation and lack of 
development on the agenda of the organisation. The South African government has 
persistently worked towards establishing a partnership between the United Nations 
and regional bodies such as the African Union in promoting good governance and 
development, which manifests in programmes such as the New Partnership for 
African Development (NEPAD). 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have become the new global driving 
force, where South Africa has used its membership within smaller alliances to steer 
greater global initiatives which are to be met by 2015. The second area focuses on 
global governance, which will discuss South Africa’s newly elected non-permanent 
(rotated) seat at the United Nations Security Council, and its campaign to reform the 
United Nations. 
The rationale for choosing these areas are simply put as being the most consistent 
areas within foreign policy which have been mentioned in policy documents since 
1994, amidst the criticism of an incoherent and ambiguous foreign policy. These 
strategic areas have been reaffirmed in President Thabo Mbeki’s State of the Nation 
Address in 2007 and are closely associated with some of the key strategic areas 
identified in the Department of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan 2006-2009.  
4.2  THE UNITED NATIONS – ORGANISED MULTILATERALISM 
“To most of the world, the United Nations symbolizes the hope for international peace 
and security through global cooperation, dialogue, and collective responses to security 
threats. The UN flag, as it flies over UN offices and peacekeeping missions around 
the world, is a constant reminder of this aspiration. The flag’s blue field holds a lonely 
planet earth embraced by olive branches. This cloth was woven from the last 
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remaining threads of hope which had survived two devastating world wars” (Krasno, 
2002: 3).  
 
The United Nations has become the symbolic representation of the world’s need for 
cooperation and global understanding.  It is the “embodiment of Multilateralism” and 
as an organisation has manifested as the central overarching authority” (The United 
Nations General Assembly, 1995 A/RES/50/49)8. From 50 “peace loving” member 
states in 1945, the organisation now consists of 192 independent states, making it the 
only global intergovernmental organisation with an almost universal membership 
(Joyner in Sills, 2002:3) unlike, its predecessor, the League of Nations, which was 
weakened by the lack of membership, especially that of the United States. 
 
The idea of a coalition of “united nations” was initiated by the United States war time 
President F.D. Roosevelt towards the end of World War Two, based on the 
reconstitution of the failed League of Nation’s framework of consultation, peaceful 
settlement, however due to the League’s inability to prevent a second world war, the 
enforcement power would be given “teeth” (coercive measures) to prevent aggression 
(Krasno, 2002: 9). The organisation is thus based on the principle of collective 
security to maintain peace and security not only through coercive military means but 
also through economic sanction, to prevent a third world war but to also to “save the 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (The United Nations Charter, 1945). 
However, it also provides a forum for dialogue and an environment in which 
negotiation and diplomatic solutions are encouraged for pacific settlements of 
disputes (Krasno, 2004: 4). Although the new organisation was specifically focused 
on security issues, economic and social issues were also included under the 
competences of the organisation, as they deemed that problems of this nature had 
been the fundamental causes in previous conflicts (Krasno, 2002: 15).  
 
As the  “one, universal organization in the world today that can set globally accepted 
standards and norms of behaviour”, not only are the main bodies driving the 
organisations normative power but also its individual agencies, programmes, funds, 
and the international agreements (Sills, 2002: 1). The UN charter forms the basis for 
                                                 
8 Resolution on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations Organisation 
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these norms and standards as a legally binding treaty of which its signatories have 
accepted to respect and conform to the values which have been cherished by 
humankind, like peace, harmony, cooperation and solidarity derived from the 
awareness of common humanity, and those which have evolved through the more 
recent strivings of humankind like fundamental freedoms, basic human rights, equity, 
and justice (UN Charter, Sills, 2002: 3).    
 
The United Nations Organisation’s core functions outlined in the Charter are as 
follows:  
 
• To maintain peace and security and to manage the prevailing international 
order. 
• To maintain the norms of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 
• To prevent a resurgence of causes of social upheaval and conflict by the 
development and rehabilitation work of the specialized agencies. 
 
There are six principle organs of the United Nations which make up the core of the 
organisation, (The General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social 
Council, the Secretariat, International Court of Justice and the Trusteeship Council), 
all of which attempt to operate in its own capacity to enforce the norms of the UN and 
the above mentioned functions.  
Two of the more prominent organs in maintaining peace and security are the General 
Assembly and Security Council The General Assembly is the world's forum for 
discussing matters affecting world peace and security, and for making 
recommendations concerning them. It has no power to enforce decisions. It is 
composed of the 51 original member nations and those admitted since, totaling 192. 
On important questions, including international peace and security, a two-thirds 
majority of those present and voting is required. Decisions on other questions are 
made by a simple majority. Emphasis is given to questions relating to international 
peace and security brought before it by members, the Security Council, or non-
members. It also maintains a broad programme of international cooperation in 
economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and for assisting in human 
rights and freedoms (Charter of the United Nations: Chapter IV, 1945) 
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The Security Council is the primary instrument for establishing and maintaining 
international peace. Its main purpose is to prevent war by settling disputes between 
nations. Under the charter, the council is permitted to dispatch a UN force to stop 
aggression. All member nations undertake to make available armed forces, assistance, 
and facilities to maintain international peace and security. The Security Council has 
15 members. There are five permanent members: the United States, the Russian 
Federation, Britain, France, and China; and ten temporary members elected by the 
General Assembly for two-year terms, from five different regions of the world. 
Voting on procedural matters requires a nine-vote majority to carry (Charter of the 
United Nations: Chapter V). However, on questions of substance, the vote of each of 
the five permanent members is required. As of January 2007, the ten elected non-
permanent members were Belgium, Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, 
Panama, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia, and South Africa, however by January 2008 the terms 
of Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Peru, Qatar, and Slovakia will expire (United 
Nations Security Council, 2007).  
As mentioned earlier, one of the other means the UN was meant to set about 
accomplishing this task was to try to root out causes of war through its activities in the 
economic, social, cultural and human rights fields. The work of the “other United 
Nations”, a term used to describe the Economic and Social Council, now spans a vast 
range of activities, including: the compiling and standardizing of statistical data, 
setting technical and legal standards in functional areas of global interaction, and 
conducting policy oriented research and analysis. On the humanitarian side it 
includes: promoting child survival, human rights and women’s equality, improving 
the livelihood and security of the poor, ensuring sustainable environmental 
management, supporting refugees and vulnerable social groups, preventing AIDS, 
fighting illicit drug trafficking, and providing emergency relief to victims of war, 
flood, drought and crop failure. This list is by no means exhaustive (Fomerand, 
2003:1).  
 
The developmental work of the United Nations can be grouped essentially into four 
broad categories: 1) policy and analytical undertakings which provide the 
underpinning for intergovernmental deliberations; 2) facilitation of the efforts of 
member-states to set norms and standards and build consensus on a range of 
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international issues; 3) global advocacy on development issues; and 4) support of 
national development efforts through technical cooperation activities in developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition. These multifaceted tasks are 
carried out through a complex maze of institutions, which emerged over time without 
a pre-established blueprint and largely as a result of political pressures. The General 
Assembly along with its Second Committee (dealing with economic and social issues) 
and its Third Committee (humanitarian issues) stands at the apex of the system as the 
UN’s supreme policy making organ. (Fomerand, 2003: 1-2) 
 
The Charter contains extensive provisions in this regard. Furthermore, the United 
Nations established for this purpose a whole network of institutions, the UN system, 
which includes its Specialised Agencies, Regional Economic Commissions and other 
organisations and specialised institutions subsequently created by the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. The UNESCO Constitution 
describes this overall purpose of the Charter in a fundamental way. It says: “Since 
wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace 
must be constructed. Formally, these bodies report to ECOSOC. In practice, ECOSOC 
exerts only a loose degree of coordination as the Agencies have their own governing 
bodies and separate budgets (Fomerand, 2003: 3).  
4.2.1 CHALLENGING THE UN 
The United Nations has remained resilient based on its principles and values as well 
as the legitimacy which its member states bestow on it. During the Cold War, 
multilateralism was waning, as the organisation and its members endured the power 
politics of the ideological warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The Security Council in constant deadlock highlighted the dilemma of unequal 
representation within the Security Council as well as the right to veto only by the Big 
5 and the need to reform. The UN however, has been affected by the world system in 
flux and its structural inadequacies have been challenging the existence and 
importance of the organisation (Sills, 2002:35).  Since the recognition of globalisation 
the nature of security (or insecurity) has changed and citizens of the world now face 
cross-border threats such as terrorism, global warming underdevelopment and 
inequality and food and water shortages, but has also increased the development gap 
between the wealthy and poor (Thakur, 2004: 67). This process emphasises the 
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changing contours of the international system and the changing nature of global 
governance. There is a greater need for cooperation and a common solution amongst 
member nations (Le Pere et al, 2008: 3).  
 
The United Nations also found itself in a crisis of multilateralism with the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, which also happened to be the opening day of the 56th General 
Assembly, and its inability to predict or react to it (Sills, 2002:33). In addition, the 
unilateral action taken by the United States against Iraq had broken down the 
international consensus over the issue of international terrorism and left the United 
Nations and the international system profoundly shaken.  
 
The United State’s action within the United Nations proves perfectly the point argued 
by Caporaso (1993: 54) and Martin (1993), that multilateral institutions and the 
institution of multilateralism do not always mirror one another. This being said, 
“multilateral organizations may provide arenas within which actors learn to alter 
perceptions of interests and beliefs”, however, the “institution of multilateralism may 
in turn spawn, maintain, alter and undermine specific organizations” (Caporaso, 1993: 
54). Puchala (2005: 571) argues that the United States hegemony extends beyond the 
economic ascendancy and management of the international economy as explained by 
hegemonic stability theory, but includes “rule making and management in areas of the 
international development security and peacekeeping, state building, national 
building, democratic transition and human rights.”  The United States has used the 
UN to legitimise its actions around the world, by pursuing its goals through its right to 
veto in the Security Council and by holding the organisation ransom for access to its 
resources. As an American borne concept, many view the UN as “the servant of the 
long standing US hegemony” (Puchala, 2005: 573-574). At present the United States 
foreign policy behaviour favours unilateral action or bilateral relations as opposed to 
multilateralism in international affairs, and has received criticism largely from the 
South who have instilled faith in the UN, blaming the US “to be foisting institutions 
and values on the rest of the world, particularly those concerning economic liberalism, 
and narrowly conceived notion of democratization, and using the UN to enforce this 
agenda” (Puchala, 2005:575)  
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Nevertheless, the world is going through a period of flux where global power is 
shifting eastwards and southwards, because developing countries such as China and 
India are starting to emerge as potential powerful actors (The Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs, 2006). Countries from the South continue to play an instrumental role 
in driving development and structural change in the United Nations. They were also 
able to set up an enlarged disarmament committee, a committee (of twenty-four) on 
decolonisation, a special committee on apartheid, and UNCTAD (Morphet, 2004: 
525).  
The importance of the United Nations in the international system is reaffirmed by 
Kofi Annan (2004), as: 
Are you right in believing that the UN matters? I think you are, because the UN 
offers the best hope of a stable world and a broadly equitable world order, based 
on generally accepted rules. That statement has been much questioned in the 
past year. But recent events have reaffirmed, and even strengthened, its validity. 
A rule-based system is in the interest of all countries — especially today. 
Globalisation has shrunk the world. The very openness, which is such an 
important feature of today's successful societies, makes deadly weapons 
relatively easy to obtain, and terrorists relatively difficult to restrain. Today, the 
strong feel almost as vulnerable to the weak as the weak feel vulnerable to the 
strong. So it is in the interest of every country to have international rules and 
abide by them. And such a system can only work if, in devising and applying 
the rules, the legitimate interests of all countries are accommodated, and 
decisions are reached collectively. That is the essence of multilateralism, and 
the founding principle of the United Nations. 
 
4.3 SOUTH AFRICA’S PARTICIPATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS PRE-1994 
South Africa had been a signatory to the “Covenant”9 of the League of Nations, as 
much as it was a signatory and contributor to its successor, the United Nations 
Organisation and its Charter in 1945. Both organisations were created with the 
purpose to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and 
security. South Africa’s international standing was grounded by the status of General 
Jan Smuts and his contribution to the war effort. Smuts’ involvement in the 
international arena was one of great irony, in that he had assisted in the chartering of 
                                                 
9 The League's charter, known as the Covenant, was approved as part of the Treaty of Versailles at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919. South Africa was one of the 32 original members and signatories to the Treaty of Peace (United 
Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) Library: http://www.unog.ch/)  
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the UN preamble and was a passionate advocate of human rights and promoter on 
international reconciliation (Marshall, 2000:5), however at home in South Africa the 
non-white population were becoming disgruntled with their political and economic 
marginalisation.  
The Native Representative Council, the African National Congress (ANC), the 
Transvaal Indian Council and other organisations had been instrumental in pushing 
for these grievances to be attended to. In August 1946, after WWII, Jan Smuts 
established the Fagan Commission, which investigated the laws relating to urban 
Blacks, pass laws, and the socio-economic circumstances of migrant workers (Reddy, 
1998). Even though the commission had founded and suggested in one of its three 
policies that there was an acceptance of the fact that Whites and the other races 
existed side by side in South Africa (in opposition to the belief that they were only 
temporary residents in White areas who should stay in their reserves) and that 
legislation and administration would have to take into account the differences between 
them, the South African government enforced its internal policies of Apartheid10 .  
4.3.1 FROM PARAGON TO PARIAH11 
The South African Nationalist Party in 1948,  pursued its apartheid ("separateness") 
policy through minority rule and sought the "separate development" of South Africa's 
races through institutionalised social, economic, political, and legal segregation of 
South African whites, blacks, Indians, and "Coloureds" (people of mixed race).  The 
adoption of this domestic policy of discrimination marked the demise of South Africa 
as a respected and active member of the international community. South Africa “was 
on a collision course with the world community” (Geldenhuys, 1997:36), and its 
participation as a member of the United Nations became more uncomfortable as the 
General Assembly and Security Council took to more coercive measures to get the 
government to reconsider its policies (Hamill and Spence, 1997). 
                                                 
10 Apartheid  was a rigorous and ideological formulation of attitudes, practices and law long in evidence in the white-
ruled South Africa, 
11 Title used by Sarah Pienaar in Pienaar, S. 1987. South Africa and international relations between the two world wars: 
the League of Nations dimension. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press 
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The issue of racial discrimination was first brought to the agenda of the United 
Nations in 194612 by the Indian Government regarding the treatment of people of 
Indian origin in the “Union of South Africa”, which resulted in resolution A/RES/44 
(I) (1946) being passed by the General Assembly on 8 December 1946 (Reddy, 1991, 
Reddy, 1998). This resolution on the Indian matter was followed by a letter from 
Indian representatives to the United Nations in July 1948 recalling the previous 
resolution, as issues remained unresolved between the Union and India with regards to 
the “denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms, on purely racial grounds” and 
the Union’s commitment to the “policy of "apartheid", or racial segregation, and the 
domination of all non-white peoples by the Europeans” (A/577, 1948)13 (Reddy, 
1998). In each case brought forward to the General Assembly, the South African 
government appealed for the matter to be removed from the GA agenda as it was 
regarded as a matter of “domestic jurisdiction of South Africa” based on Chapter I (2), 
clause 7 of the UN charter, these appeals were rejected by the GA on all occasions. 
On 2 December 1950, recalling its resolutions 44(I) and 265 (III) relating to the 
treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, the GA that "a 
policy of 'racial segregation' (apartheid) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial 
discrimination" (Resolution 395(V): 1950). The passive resistance campaign led by 
the ANC and South African Indian Congress (SAIA) continued in South Africa, 
seeing thousands being imprisoned for contravening laws. Thirteen Asian-African 
Member States requested the GA to consider "The question of race conflict in South 
Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of 
South Africa” on the agenda of the seventh regular session of the UNGA (A/2183), 
recalling the Preamble of the United Nations and Article 1, paragraph 3, and Article 
55 c of the Charter which proclaimed universal respect for, and the due observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion.  
                                                 
12 A passive resistance campaign by the Indian community, led by Dr. Y.M. Dadoo and Dr. G.M. Naicke in response to 
the The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act ("Ghetto Act") that was passed June of that year 
(http://www.anc.org.za/un/un-chron.html) 
13 Letter dated 12 July 1948 from the representative of India to the Secretary-General concerning the treatment of Indians in 
South Africa. A/577, 16 July 1948 (http://www.undp.org.za/docs/apartheid/undocs1a.html#2) 
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Towards the end of 1952, the General Assembly adopted resolution 616(VII) 
establishing a three-member Commission to study the racial situation in South Africa 
(United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa - 
UNCORS) and the issue of apartheid appeared repeatedly on the GA’s agenda 
thereafter.  The apartheid government started withdrawing its memberships from the 
United Nations specialised agencies. The United Nations Educational and Scientific 
Organisation (UNESCO) was the first to be abandoned in 1955, in protest against the 
agencies activities against racial discrimination. By 27 November 1956, the 
government decided to maintain only token representation at the meetings of the GA 
and at the Headquarters of the UN. According to Eric Louw who was the Minister of 
External Affairs, this decision was taken due to the continued interference by the 
General Assembly in South Africa's domestic affairs in violation of Article 2, 
paragraph 7 of the Charter. (Reddy, 1998) 
Efforts from the assembly became increasingly more determined during the period 
after 1960, which also saw the Security Council becoming involved. It is also during 
this period that the United Nations promotion of human rights and self-determination 
spurred on anti-colonial movements and demise of the old order and birth of the 
newly independent states in Africa and the rest of the developing world. These new 
states not only changed the composition of the UN, but also influenced the agenda of 
the international community (Bennett, 1955: 128).  
After the Sharpeville massacre in 1961, both the GA and SC passed its first resolution 
deploring the policies of the Pretoria government and viewed the continuation thereof 
as a threat to international peace and security (Bennett, 1995:130; S/RES/134 (1960)). 
In 1962, the GA requested that member states take specific diplomatic and economic 
measures, separately or collectively and also established the “Special Committee 
against Apartheid”. The Committee would eventually become the official watchdog, 
ensuring that apartheid remain under continuous consideration in the United Nations.  
 
The General Assembly in 1973 declared apartheid a crime against humanity, upon 
adopting the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid. In that same year the GA, declared that the South African regime 
no longer held the right to represent the people of South Africa and recognised the 
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liberation movements recognised by the Organisation of African Unity as the 
authentic representatives of the overwhelmingly majority of the South African people 
(A/RES/3151 G (XXVIII), 1973).  The ANC thus gained greater exposure and 
experience in the international arena, even though the party and its members were 
labelled as “terrorists” and exiled from South Africa in 1963. (Alden, 1993). 
However, continued pressure from both the Non-aligned Nations and OAU, saw 
South Africa eventually being excluded from participating in the General Assembly, 
as well as from most UN specialised agencies.14 It was further expelled from other 
governmental and non-governmental organisations and conferences.  
 
South Africa experienced between the 1970s and 1980s, what Deon Geldenhuys 
(1997: 38) distinguished as “enforced isolation”15, to ending apartheid. This form of 
isolation saw South Africa being boycotted in sports and culture, by the GA adopting 
the “International Declaration against Apartheid in Sports (1977), and International 
Convention Against Apartheid in Sports (1985), where sports teams were no longer 
welcome to participate in international events e.g. the Olympic Games (Cornelissen, 
2006: 27). This was followed by consumer boycotts, with companies withdrawing 
from conducting business in the country, and prominent entertainers refusing to 
perform to segregated audiences.  
 
A mandatory arms and oil embargo against South Africa was imposed by the Security 
Council in 1977. It was noted as the first time in the history of the United Nation’s 
that this action under Chapter VII of the Charter was undertaken by the UNSC against 
a member state (Frost, 1997: 243). By the late 1980s significant normative shifts 
pertaining to the unacceptability of practices, rules, and norms, advocating and 
allowing human rights abuses and racist policies occurred in the international arena. 
Various international agreements were signed during this period, opening the way for 
harsher actions against the apartheid state (Frost, 1997: 244).  Previously untouchable, 
a state’s sovereignty was now challenged increasingly via international interventions 
to protect human rights, for instance. At the time, the UN Secretary General stated 
that a state’s individual sovereignty is replaced by a universal sovereignty, in that 
                                                 
14  The  Food and Agriculture Organication of the United Nations (FAO) in 1963. and the International  Labour 
Organisation (ILO) in 1964. 
15 the more effective approach out of four approaches (which Geldenhuys set out), [Geldenhuys, D. 1997: 38]. 
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norms such as human rights had become universally accepted and thus challenged an 
individual states attitude towards its greater population, related to this were the 
emerging practices of states using multilateral institutions to promote human rights 
and democracy. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
example attached conditions to the granting of its loans. Moreover, multilateral 
institutions came to accept more and more responsibility for the domestic affairs of 
states via, for example, election monitoring, providing humanitarian aid and 
peacekeeping (Frost, 1997: 243-248). 
 
4.4  POST-1994 SOUTH AFRICA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 
The importance which the new South African government attached to the United 
Nations and its core principles was due to the role the organisation played not only as 
the primary vehicle for orchestrating international condemnation against apartheid but 
also providing “symbolic recognition of South Africa’s isolation in the international 
community” (Hamill and Spence, 1997:226). The principles and values defined 
through the Freedom Charter and its Constitution, reflect core values and principles 
vested in the charter of the United Nations which included a “democratic, peaceful, 
stable, prosperous, non-racist and non-sexist society with respect for human life, and 
which contributes to a world that is just and equitable” (Dlamini Zuma, 2005).  
 The new government also recognised the power of solidarity emanating from 
decolonised member states who also belonged to the OAU and NAM , who had 
worked together to coerce the various bodies to isolate the oppressive white 
government in every sphere, even throughout the ideological tensions of the Cold War 
between the super powers. The resilience and importance of the norm of human rights 
was strengthened and allowed for the world to recognise the injustices in one country 
(Dlamini-Zuma, 2006).  
The global status of South Africa has since increased significantly through the 
participation and projection of its “soft power” in the United Nations bodies, agencies, 
conferences and General Assembly sessions. Soft power, as defined by Joseph Nye 
(in Van der Westhuizen, 2006: 138), is “cooperative power involving intangible 
power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions”, which is usually used by 
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countries (emerging middle powers) who do not possess extreme power and material 
capabilities to bring about change within the international system or reform the 
system in itself”. South Africa as an emerging middle power has thus used its 
symbolic power with regards to its victory over the apartheid government to drive its 
greater foreign policy agenda within the United Nations. 
In 1996 South Africa had the task of presidency of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD IX) serving a four-year term. In 1997, the country 
served as the vice-president of the United Nations General Assembly as well as 
becoming chair of the UN Commission on Human Rights for a three-year term. 
Pretoria then continued to be elected on the executive boards of the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund.  It also juggled chairing 
Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Implementation of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test ban as well as sitting on the UN’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation’s council (Cornelissen, 2006:29). SA was elected as vice-chairperson of 
the GA’s Economic and Financial Committee in 2003. Since this committee is viewed 
as one of the more influential, it was regarded as a particularly significant 
achievement by the SA Government. Most recently South Africa was finally elected 
as a non-permanent African member of the Security Council (Cornelissen, 2006:29).  
These multiple activities are a clear indication of South Africa ability to “punch above 
its weight” diplomatically. In its capacity as either president or chairman or member 
of either of the above mentioned bodies, South Africa has tried to intervene and 
support a particular position “in breaking a deadlock or securing the cooperation of 
the various parties to the multilateral initiative” (Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen, 
2001:3). 
4.4.1 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCES 
Hosting United Nations conferences have been one of the main platforms for South 
Africa to project itself as the self-proclaimed voice of the developing world and also 
to pursue its reformist agenda, by challenging certain aspects of global governance 
without upsetting the greater structural power and order (Van der Westhuizen, 2006: 
142; Nel et al, 2001). Conferences in general have been utilised as opportunities for 
norm-creation that were non-binding but widely accepted (Sills, 2002: 25). As Van 
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der Westhuizen (2006: 143) asserts, “…Pretoria’s eagerness to host such events is 
explained by the need to sustain its symbolic influence as a leading spokesperson for 
the developing world, while for the purposes of domestic political consumption, 
demonstrating its commitment to the reformation of institutions of global 
governance”.   
 
Masumi Ono (2001: 175) observes: 
 
The major United Nations global conferences of the 1990s focussed 
international attention on key aspects of global change and 
development…These conferences generated bold pronouncements, 
with much fanfare, set forth ambitious international agreed goals and 
commitments. But it is the implementation of these goals that will 
determine whether each conference is ultimately a success or failure. 
The United Nations, to play its part in the implementation, has to adapt 
to a major change in development strategies. 
United Nations-sponsored global conferences usually draw a lot of attention from the 
media which helps to highlight the issue being discussed, the process helps to identify 
and analyse global problems and suggestions for solutions and also in formulating 
norms around this issue, for instance human rights. Sills (2002: 28-29) propounds that 
global conferences also provide a forum for reaching consensus on universal 
standards, their declarations provide a moral authority which strengthens grassroots 
efforts to build support for normative behaviour, they bring into the process the power 
of civil society (NGOs), not only to shape norms but also provide a constituency for 
consent and implementation and offers language through the declarations that can be 
used in the eventual codification of international norms in treaties or conventions 
adopted by participating states/actors. 
South Africa has played host to three major conferences between 2000 and 2003, all 
of which served some significance to an emerging democratic South Africa into 
economic and diplomatic multilateralism. The first big initiative was South Africa’s 
chairing of the Ninth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD IX). In its leadership position South Africa tried to reaffirm, redirect and 
reactivate UNCTAD’s position and its concerns of international market, multi-
national corporations, and address the disparity between developed nations and 
developing nations, by adopting the Midrand Declaration drafted by South Africa’s 
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Alec Erwin who was also elected as the president of the forum for its tenure (Nel, 
Taylor and Van der Westhuizen, 2001: 4). With this declaration and by hosting the 
conference, South Africa sought positioning itself as a “go-between” and self-
appointed role of bridge-builder, between the industrialised North and the developing 
South (Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen 2001:30), and also provided a platform 
for the views of members to be heard and reflected on paper, “It is in this light that the 
Conference may be seen as a success: the fear of a zero-sum gain outcome was 
replaced with the benefits of a win-win outcome (Carim, 1996). Even though 
UNCTAD has been given greater impetus to continue with its mandate, the general 
trend of international trade bargaining groupings amongst the more prosperous 
member countries has taken off. Groupings such as the G20+ and the India-Brazil-
South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), seem to be more successful in exerting 
pressure in international trade decision-making (Cornelissen, 2006:30). 
In 2001 and 2002, South Africa continued to project itself as a “global destination of 
choice for negotiation and discussion” (Van der Westhuizen, 2006: 143) by hosting 
the United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Xenophobia and Related 
Discrimination (WCAR) and United Nations World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) respectively. The capacity and logistical arrangements of both 
these conferences had put South Africa on the map, but the “discordant nature and the 
contentions surrounding the conduct and outcomes of the conferences…exposed 
many of the limitations of South Africa’s efforts to place itself at the diplomatic 
forefront of the developing world” (Cornelissen, 2006). Although the outcome was 
not as expected, these two conferences provided another occasion and platform for 
South Africa to elevate issues of African marginalisation and the disparity within the 
international system. 
4.5  THE PROMOTION OF THE AFRICA AGENDA AND GLOBAL AGENDA REFORM 
South Africa has always been given the opportunity to voice its opinion and also 
given the scope to provide direction in pursuing certain actions. “Good international 
citizenship” takes its cue from an expanding agenda of global problems that no 
country can solve on its own” (Geldenhuys, 2006: 95). Common challenges are 
addressed through “global cooperation” typically under the aegis of multilateral 
organisations, and by means of international regime. “Good international citizenship 
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moderates the realist struggle for power by promoting a rule-governed international 
order, which in turn serves the security interest of middle powers, which lack 
significant military capabilities in global terms” (Evans, quoted in Geldenhuys, 2006: 
95; Vickers, 2003: 31-2; Schoeman, 2003: 349-67).  
“South Africa offers hope for all humanity so we cannot only strive for a better life 
for South Africa but we have to contribute to the ongoing struggle for a better world. 
That is what gives us the degree of moral authority in the world” (Dlamini Zuma, 
2001). 
South African motives are premised on the fact that all countries who do not form part 
of the developed North are destined the same fate of marginalisation and 
underdevelopment. As Aziz Pahad (2000) asserted, “[t] he developed countries must 
accept that there can be no islands of prosperity in a sea of poverty. They cannot feel 
secure and hope to continue to develop while many other countries in the world get 
poorer” (Pahad, 2000).  
According to the Human Development Report (2006), sub-Saharan Africa is the only 
region which has not only stagnated with regards to the Human Development Index 
(HDI), but in which 18 countries had lower HDI scores in 2006 than in 1990. The 
African continent finds itself in this situation due to its inherited disadvantages of the 
global slave trade, colonialism, and multiple European backed commercial ventures 
which exploited the natural resources and wealth of the continent and left “scorched 
earth” which provided little institutional, infrastructural and human capital when 
African countries began to achieve independence during the past century (Osaghae, 
1999, Southall, 1999). 
 
The continent has also been negatively affected by post- Cold War politics; protracted 
conflicts, structural adjustment programmes and HIV/Aids pandemic have left the 
continent poorer than before. Unlike East Asia, which has enjoyed a dramatic 
reduction in the absolute number of people living in poverty over the last 15 years, 
sub Saharan Africa has seen dramatic increases in both the total number of poor 
people and the fraction of its population that is poor (Human Development Report, 
2006: 265). 
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The sad reality is that the world’s poor and exploited are largely people of colour. 
Bischoff (2006:152) therefore refers to the inequities in world development as “global 
apartheid” (not only in terms of geography but also in terms of colour) which 
obstructs the emancipation of most of humanity. “If global governance is to mean 
anything, it needs to be about democratizing international relations and deconstructing 
the global economic and colour divide” (Bischoff, 2006: 152). 
 
But the problems of the continent persist - debt and inequitable trade are at the heart 
of Africa’s problems and sometimes powerful elites within Africa collaborate with 
exploiters in the North at the detriment of their own nations. During the last half 
century, the economic performance of the developing world has been far from 
uniform. Developing countries were polarised into those that made great progress in 
catching up and those that were mired in economic stagnation. Many African 
countries belong to the second group.  
At the Millennium Summit held in September 2000 in New York, representatives of 
191 countries adopted the Millennium Declaration. Among the 191 representatives 
were 147 Heads of State or Heads of Government including African Heads of State. 
The Declaration focused on concerns arising from peace, security and development 
issues and covered areas including environment, human rights and the sound 
management of public affairs. The Declaration sought to integrate into one overall 
programme a variety of complementary and mutually reinforcing development goals 
(Report of the Secretary General, 2001). These goals and the development targets 
defined by the world conferences and summits of the 1990s are related but in some 
respects different. Recently, the various categories of goals were regrouped into the 
“Millennium Development Goals.”  
One year after states pledged to work towards attaining the MDGs, the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development, a vision and strategic framework for Africa’s 
renewal was launched as a driver for African countries to move from long severe 
poverty, and consequently in reaching the MDGs. Thabo Mbeki, has been the 
principle architect behind NEPAD. As a multilateral forum for norm advocacy, 
NEPAD is premised on African states making commitments to good governance, 
   66
democracy, and human rights, coupled with an endeavour to prevent and resolve 
situations of conflict and instability in Africa (Geldenhuys, 2006:101).   
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) has been the single most 
important development programme to be initiated on the African continent (Hughes, 
2004: 73). The strategic framework document was developed from a mandate given to 
the five initiating Heads of State (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa) 
and by the Organisation of the African Union (OAU) to develop an integrated socio-
economic development framework for Africa. This framework launched in 2001, 
encourages the interaction between Africa and the “rest of the world, including 
industrial countries and multilateral organisation as a means of putting Africa on a 
high-growth path” (Hughes, 2004: 75).  
 
With regard to the international community, a process of sustained engagement with 
world leaders and institutions has been pursued since 2001. These strategic 
interventions have led to draft of commitments in support of the implementation of 
the African Agenda and NEPAD, including the G8 Africa Action Plan, the Monterrey 
Consensus, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, the November 2002 UN 
Declaration on support for the implementation of NEPAD and the Cairo Declaration 
(Hughes, 2004: 89-90). During a one-day High-Level Plenary meeting of the United 
Nations General Assembly during its 57th Regular Session in October 2002 
discussing a wide range of development issues also focussed on NEPAD. 
Consequently, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on NEPAD that will 
create an annual agenda item in the General Assembly on NEPAD (United Nations 
Information Service, 2003). 
 
It has been a huge task to engage the rest of Africa to ensure that South Africa is not 
perceived as exerting hegemonic pressure as a regional power, and has thus tried to 
base this initiative on “twin pillars of coalition and consensus” (Olivier, 2003: 822). 
As a purely “African” initiative and not a “project of former colonisers and racists”, 
the AU established an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), as a system of self 
assessment, and goes beyond norm advocacy to a multilateral supervisory function 
that might even involve an element of norm enforcement (Olivier, 2003: 818). 
However, the APRM was only instituted to monitor codes of economic and 
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corporative progress and not political performance, which has been viewed as self-
defeating with regards to the NEPAD’s promotion of democratic principles and 
institutions, popular participation and good governance, which are requirements for 
sustainable development on the continent (Hughes, 2004: 96; Olivier, 2003:818).  
 
South Africa has nonetheless remained committed to its African agenda and has thus 
found a larger platform to do its campaigning in eradicating poverty and achieving 
sustainable economic growth, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and the developing 
world, by consolidating relationships with the stronger more influential countries of 
the south and groupings such as the AU, the SADC, NAM, the Group of 77 and China 
(G77) and the Commonwealth. It has sought to encourage the pursuit of common 
positions and to encourage an audible collective voice within the UN system and 
multilateral fora. 
During its tenure (January 2006-January 2007) as the chairman of the G77+ China, 
the South Africa government had already initiated and made great strides towards 
attaining certain aspects of its reformist agenda in democratising and legitimising 
multilateralism within the United Nations, and creating a platform for better 
achievement of its African agenda. In her statement on handing over the chairmanship 
of the G77+China, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma (2007) highlighted the most salient achievements of the group’s commitment to 
an equitable world system in 2006.  
The Group of 77 plus China have continued to call for concerted multilateral action to 
achieve the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) as a means towards solving economic and social 
problems and promoting peace and security. The body also worked for the creation of 
an enabling international economic environment in order to support developing 
countries efforts to achieve sustained economic growth and sustainable development.  
On achieving the Millennium Development Goals, the group stressed the fact that in 
spite of appropriate measures taken, and the tremendous efforts made by developing 
countries to build enabling environments for development, the support received from 
development partners is still insufficient for substantial economic growth and 
economic development. They emphasised the imperative need for the full and timely 
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implementation of all the outcomes of all major conferences and summits in the 
economic, social and related fields in order to meet the MDGs target date of 2015. 
“Yet, 2006 will also be remembered as the year in which we developing countries 
successfully withstood numerous attempts to divide us. Through our unity, we 
ensured that Member States adopted decisions that guaranteed the smooth and 
effective functioning of the United Nations and reflected the interests of developing 
countries” (Dlamini-Zuma, 2007) 
In the South African Department of Foreign Affair’s Strategic Plan 2006-2008, the 
South African government stated that it would continue to play a prominent role in 
terms of the UN’s budgetary and administrative activities to ensure that South 
Africa’s interests as well as those of the continent are adequately catered for in the 
UN budget.  
 
By the means of consensus the G77+China was able to challenge the United States, 
Japan and the European Union, who had imposed a US$ 950 million spending cap for 
2006, with the United States refusing to contribute unless the UN adopted major 
managerial reforms of the organisation’s budget. In negotiating the 2005 spending cap 
on the UN Regular Budget, the Group of 77 and China ensured that the spending cap 
was lifted which guaranteed the continued financial solvency of the United Nations 
and enabled the Secretary-General to implement programmes and activities for the 
remainder of 2006 and 2007 (Lehmann and Mcclelan, 2006:2). This initiative also 
reminds one of the South African government’s commitments to support the United 
Nations and to strengthen multilateralism in its leadership role.  
 
The Group of 77 and China also upheld the right of every Member State to pronounce 
on administrative and budgetary matters, irrespective of the size of their contributions, 
as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations by sponsoring a resolution that their 
partners did not support. Through further dialogue and negotiation, the group also 
managed to ensure that the General Assembly adopted a second resolution on 
governance and oversight by consensus (Dlamini-Zuma, 2007).  
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On Secretariat and Management Reforms, the Group of 77 and China ensured the 
adoption of no fewer than five General Assembly resolutions addressing various 
issues including the increase in the representation of developing countries in the 
Secretariat, in particular at senior levels; the increase in access for vendors from 
developing countries in the United Nations procurement market; and the improvement 
of accountability by the Secretariat towards Member States in the use of resources and 
the implementation of mandates.  
As stated by the Group of 77 and China: “We supported the establishment of a 
peacebuilding support office, the provision of resources required for the functioning 
of the Human Rights Council, the adoption of new accounting standards for the 
United Nations, improving the information and communication technology system of 
the United Nations, strengthening the procurement function of the Secretariat, 
increasing the level of the Working Capital Fund, and strengthening the oversight 
functions. We also set a framework for the consideration in 2007 of measures to 
reform the human resources management system and policies, oversight and 
accountability structures, and the procurement system ” (Zuma, 2007). 
Since its readmission to the United Nations, and chairing various UN committees, 
South Africa had still not been elected to occupy a seat on the United Nations Security 
Council, until 16 October 2006, when the country was elected by the Member States 
of the United Nations General Assembly (GA) to serve in the Security Council as a 
non-permanent member for the period 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2008 
(Wheeler, 2006; South Africa info, 2007).  
 
South Africa’s candidature had previously been endorsed by the African Union as 186 
States out of 192 voted in favour of South Africa. The United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) now comprised of fifteen member states, with the United States, 
United Kingdom, France, Russia and China as permanent seat holders and veto 
power, and for 2007-2008 non-permanent seats were filled by Congo, Ghana, South 
Africa, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Indonesia, Belgium, Italy and the Slovak Republic who 
are eligible for rotating one month UNSC presidency (UN General Assembly 
Resolution, GA/10516: 2006). 
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Membership of the Security Council has provided an opportunity to promote the 
South Africa’s foreign policy and national interests, as well as to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security globally. This position also affords 
South Africa the opportunity to help promote multilateralism and respect for 
international law as the most appropriate means of achieving global political and 
economic stability.  In particular South Africa would use its membership to help 
promote and advance the African agenda (Pahad, 2007). 
South Africa however maintained to respect the system and work which the Security 
Council does by upholding the functions and powers of maintaining peace and 
security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, investigating any 
dispute or situation which might lead to international friction, recommending methods 
of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement ( Pahad, 2007).   
Within this new position as non-permanent member and during its rotating tenure as 
President of the UNSC, South Africa had achieved some notable successes. As Co-
chair of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Mandate Review, South Africa helped review the 
UNSC mandates with an eye toward eliminating or consolidating as per 2005 World 
Summit recommendations.  
In an attempt to consolidate the African Agenda, South African decided to utilise its 
membership to initiate a further exploration of the relationship between the United 
Nations and regional, sub-regional organisations/arrangements – and in particular the 
African Union - in the maintenance of international peace and security, in terms of 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Dlamini-Zuma, 2007; Nene, 2007) . 
Minister Dlamini Zuma chaired a Ministerial open debate (28 March 2007) in the 
Security Council to launch the initiative. South Africa seemed successful in 
convincing the Security Council to request the Secretary-General to prepare a report 
setting out options for sharing the burden associated with peacekeeping between the 
UN and regional organisations. The initiative is also a direct response to the AU 
Summit decision that called upon the UN Security Council to find ways of deepening 
the partnership between regional organisations and the UN (Dlamini-Zuma, 2007; 
Nene, 2007) . 
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South Africa intends to sustain its initiative on Chapter VIII peacekeeping 
arrangements throughout its tenure of the Security Council, “We hope that out of this 
will emerge concrete ideas of enhancing this cooperation and a buy-in on methods of 
burden sharing” (Dlamini-Zuma, 2007; Nene, 2007).   
Within its position as the President of the UNSC, South Africa notably revived a 
former practice of conducting regular briefings on UNSC work to the General 
Assembly and the international media. The delegation in New York conducted regular 
briefings to keep African countries fully informed of developments in the Security 
Council. The feedback provided by African countries also helped inform South 
African interventions in the Security Council. This was an effort to improve the 
Security Council’s transparency and accountability vis-à-vis the wider UN 
membership (Dlamini-Zuma, 2007). 
South Africa managed to be successful in this new position, as it was promoting 
reform within in the UNSC by placing the plight of the African continent on the 
agenda, which resonates within its greater foreign policy; however, it was faced with a 
few issues which challenged its stance on other foreign policy objectives. 
Most notably the political unrest in Myanmar, and the international communities 
condemnation at the Myanmar government for its violent actions and the unlawful 
detaining of political prisoners (Daw Aung San Suu Kyi), and the human rights 
abuses in using rape as a weapon of war notably, and had co-sponsored a draft 
resolution in January 2007 (UNSC Update Report, 2007; Wheeler, 2007). 
As stated earlier, Nelson Mandela had ardently pursued issues of human rights during 
his presidential tenure and had set a precedent for a South African moral high within 
its foreign policy, continuing as one of the main objectives of the incumbent Mbeki 
government. However, since then South African stance on the situation, before and 
after the 1994 democratic elections had been less vocal.  
When a UNSC draft-resolution concerning the plight of the Myanmar people 
appeared on the agenda for voting at the Security Council on 12 January, South Africa 
had caused an outcry from many within the international community and at home, by 
voting against the resolution. The country’s aligned its vote with China and Russia, 
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who as permanent members (and also known for their poor human rights record) of 
double vetoed the resolution, instead of aligning itself with either of the two other 
African non-permanent members who did not vote against the resolution (Associated 
Press, 1997; Wheeler, 2007).  
In an attempt to redeem itself from any scorn, the South African delegation echoed 
China’s argument, saying that the situation in Myanmar did not constitute as a threat 
to international or regional insecurity based the on regular consultations with The 
Association Of South Asian Nations (ASEAN) even though Indonesia decided to 
abstain and not oppose the resolution (Wheeler, 2007) who had been actively 
campaigning for human rights in Burma). Even though South Africa was “deeply 
concerned” about the situation in Myanmar, it felt that a Security Council resolution 
would encroach on the competencies of the UN Human Rights Council, which was 
the best suited forum to deal with the issues at hand (Wheeler, 2007; Pahad. 2007).  
Another a cause of concern, was that an agreed common African position was non-
existent, Congo (Brazzaville) who represented the Chair of the AU abstained, and 
Ghana voted in favour of the resolution based on the African Union position of not 
recognising military regimes who come into power through military coups (in Africa) 
(Wheeler, 2007). 
Observers have argued that South Africa’s legal and technical approach to the 
situation was reminiscent of the Apartheid government. As anti-apartheid activist and 
South African Nobel Peace laureate Emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu, stated,  "… 
[i]f others had used the arguments we are using today when we asked them for their 
support against apartheid, we might still have been unfree," and that’s its vote had left  
"[t] he tyrannical military regime is gloating, and we sided with them," (Hoagland, 
2007). Had South Africa abstained the country would have saved some face, whilst 
still maintaining its attempts at UN reformation. 
Once again South Africa’s foreign policy goals appeared in contradiction and 
incoherent based on its support for human rights but also its drive to reform the 
United Nations machinery. The country’s election to the Security seat should have 
reaffirmed rather than eroded the country’s moral high ground.  
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Nonetheless, South Africa had supported a recent decision by the United Nations 
Security Council to dispatch UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari to Myanmar to 
evaluate the situation in Myanmar.  
4.6  UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT 
“An entirely different global issue in which South Africa features as a norm advocate 
is the perennial one of reforming the United Nations” (Geldenhuys, 2006:102). The 
ANC government has advocated the reform of the United Nations since it came into 
power in 1994, as one of the main structural reforms based on the norm of equality 
amongst nations as prescribed in the UN Charter. As Nelson Mandela asserted, for an 
accountable and democratic organisation and even distribution of power, the UN 
should reconsider its structure based on great power politics. This is especially true 
with regards to the Security Council, as South Africa has made no secret of its 
aspirations of wanting a “permanent presence at the global high table where major 
rules of world politics are made and enforced” (Geldenhuys, 2006:102). 
 
South Africa has pursued its UN reform canvassing through the IBSA tri-alliance. The 
troika believes that the reform of the United Nations should allow a stronger role for 
the developing countries as they make up the majority of UN members.  Their stance 
on reform is typical of reformist middlepowership in that they do not want to 
transform the entire world order to privilege these countries. However, the troika does 
wish to maintain the existing international order but with respect to international law, 
strengthen the United Nations and the Security Council and to prioritise the exercise 
of diplomacy as means to maintain international peace and security (Brasilia 
Declaration -BSD, clause 3: 2003).  
 
Therefore, the South Africa and the two other IBSA governments argue that the 
UNSC must be expanded to include developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin 
America to make it more democratic, legitimate, representative and responsive. In 
their Joint Summit Declaration the IBSA, September 2006, the three leaders 
highlighted their commitment to multilateralism and the preeminent role of the United 
Nations (BSD, clause 7). Similar positions have been articulated regarding IMF’s 
legitimacy depending on a reform of quotas being more representative of the 
developing world.  
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However, in UNSC related matters subtle differences emerge: India and Brazil have 
been explicit regarding their mutual support for each other’s candidacy for permanent 
membership as members of the G4 (with Germany and Japan). India and Brazil 
invited South Africa to join the group, but the country had to abide by African Union 
guidelines, preventing it from fielding its candidacy on its own (BuaNews, 2006). 
However, IBSA’s global justice discourse is doubtful, since the expansion of the 
UNSC would privilege only a few players. In order to achieve a lasting 
democratisation of the organisation, the General Assembly would have to be 
strengthened. 
 
South Africa had played an important role in reforming the United Nations’ 
Commission on Human Rights into the now elevated Human Rights Council, under 
the General Assembly Resolution GA 60/251. As the former Chairperson of the  Non-
Aligned Movement, South African Foreign Minister had called on the group of 
developing nations to push for a stronger and more effective Human Rights Council 
that would apply its mandate fairly and evenly across the board, “without glossing 
over violations committed in certain countries while focusing on others” (BuaNews, 
2006). Dlamini-Zuma (BuaNews, 2006) said that, “The Human Rights Commission 
ended up being weak because instead of a true human rights commission, it became 
an extension of the foreign policy of certain countries.” India, Brazil, and South 
Africa, were elected as members to the newly formed UN Human Rights Council in 
2006. South Africa had agreed in Brasilia to coordinate their contributions to the 
Council and stressed their common understanding regarding the Council’s agenda 
(universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The one challenge for the founding members would be to 
adopt a new agenda and working methods that reflected the importance of the right to 
development, as well as moral human rights issues such as the eradication of poverty 
and under-development. The African group believed the council would not be a "case 
of old wine in a new bottle," but would fulfill the aspirations of the international 
community. 
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When India and Brazil created the G4 lobby with Germany and Japan, to demand 
permanent UNSC seats they mainly wanted to improve their positions in the 
international power hierarchy. For the effective democratisation of the UN, a stronger 
role of the General Assembly allowing the participation of the global South would 
have been more adequate (UN reform watches, 2005). Furthermore South Africa 
could not share the G4 candidacies due to its regional obligations. However, an 
institutional reform of the UN that perpetuates the exclusion of Africa would 
contradict global justice and responsibility (BuaNews, 2006). 
 
Even though South Africa has shown preference to the G-4 reform, it has to maintain 
its solidarity to its African counterparts by strengthening the Ezulwini Consensus 
adopted at the meeting of the Executive Council of the African Union, held in Addis 
Ababa in March 2005 (Khumalo, 2005). The African Union has highlighted the 
strengthening of the main organs of the United Nations. Regarding the General 
Assembly, the African Union believes that it must be strengthened to play its proper 
role as the most representative and democratic body within the UN system (Khumalo, 
2005). The inter-governmental nature of the General Assembly should be reserved to 
ensure that it remains essentially a forum of inter-governmental dialogue. The African 
Union further believes that there is a need to improve on the balance of competence or 
relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council (Ikome and 
Samasuwo, 2005, 232). The ECOSOC should be strengthened in order to fulfil its role 
as the central mechanism for coordination of the activities of the UN system and its 
specialised agencies to enable it to play a pivotal role in furthering the achievement of 
the MDGs. On the matter of the reform and enlargement of the Security Council, 
Africa has expressed its preference to have not less than two permanent seats and five 
rotating non-permanent seats. The African Union has clearly stated that it seeks 
permanent seats that are truly permanent, that is, no different from the existing five 
permanent seats, and enjoying the same prerogatives and privileges, including the 
right of veto (Mantu, 2005). 
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4.7 SUMMARY 
The United Nations no longer serves as a tool for states to prevent a third world war 
exclusively by another state or group of states, but also to divert environmental, 
cultural, social and economic threats to the people within states. “One of the most 
important recent evolutions in the UN has been the changing focus of the 
Organization from a primary concern for national security to the inclusion of human 
security within the state…the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens, not just 
the immunity of the state from interference”, the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) serve as an example of the new emphasis on human security” (Krasno, 
2004:3). 
 
More than a question of whether South Africa can afford to take on permanent 
Security Council status in the future is whether it can afford not to. If South Africa 
intends on assuming a leading role in the African Renaissance and becoming more 
active in the international arena, then it has to shift from a mindset that is largely 
preoccupied with domestic problems only.  
 
In a theoretical sense, a broad approach to multilateralism is pursued by South Africa, 
and this shapes how the country behaves and sets objectives at the United Nations. 
Therefore, South Africa’s participation at the UN can not be read in isolation from its 
wider multilateral politics. There is also a reflexive impact stemming from this, as 
South Africa’s foreign policy can be said to be greatly influenced by its involvement 
in multilateral alliances of the south such as IBSA, G77+China and so forth. 
Upon further theoretical application of multilateralism and middlepowership, South 
Africa's participation and behaviour at the UN is reflective of these theoretical 
explanations. First, by definition middle powers do seek to fulfil a bridging role in the 
international system, but they also often do this in their own national interests, and 
they have a keen sense of awareness of what their national interests are.  
Second, middle powers often serve to legitimise the prevailing hegemonic order; 
although they may also (in a contradictory fashion) regard multilateralism as an 
important avenue to transform prevailing orders of world power.  
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Thirdly, middle powers operate more determinedly in the realm of norms, ideas and 
values, seeking to influence those. All of these are observable in South Africa's 
orientation to the United Nations. It also means, however, that there are contradictory 
impulses underlying SA's participation in the body, which could lead to an ambivalent 
positioning towards the body 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
As the theoretical backdrop, this study has argued that international institutions play 
an important role in the international system. The proliferation of international 
institutions since the end of World War Two and even more so at the inception of 
globalisation is evidence of this. The levels of transnational exchange and 
communication have thus increased. Multilateral institutions are created in such a way 
that smaller  states are not discriminated against as members and are allowed to exert 
some decision making based on same principles and rules of interaction (universal 
membership, everyone has equal rights). Secondly, all costs and benefits are shared 
between participants. Thirdly, there should be an element of “diffuse reciprocity.” 
Diffuse reciprocity implies that states do not rely on specific, quid-pro-quo exchanges, 
but on longer-term assurances of balance in their relations.  
 
South Africa’s re-emergence coincided with that of globalisation. The new 
government realised that in the face of advancement in technology and globalisation, 
the greatest challenge faced by the majority in the developing world, including South 
Africa, was global poverty and underdevelopment. The gap between the have and the 
have-nots were widening, and in an interdependent world, this trend would eventually 
affect the domestic issues of South Africa. Due to its regional positioning and moral 
conduct of foreign policy, South Africa has emerged as a middle power, and 
multilateralism served as one of the cornerstones in foreign policy since 1994. It’s 
commitment to multilateralism, both normatively and diplomatically, has resonated in 
government rhetoric as well as policies and guidelines. 
 
The Mbeki government has played a significant reformist role, trying to recast and 
challenge the multilateral order which would generally improve the fortunes of the 
developing world but also enhance the prospects of addressing Africa’s 
marginalisation. The country’s foreign policy objectives have resonated within their 
multilateral activity at the United Nations.  It has been argued that South Africa’s 
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participation at the United Nations has been driven by the country’s desire to 
showcase itself as a representative of the developing world and of Africa, in an 
attempt to increase its stature as a moral and African power and profile itself as a 
multilateral leader. And that South Africa has sought to model itself as a middle 
power through these multilateral engagements by challenging the present global and 
hegemonic order with its reformist policies.  
 
However, it could be that the South African government realised that even though it 
was heralded as a miracle and allowed to punch above its weight in the international 
domain, South Africa would soon become “just another country.” And its propensity 
to project its “soft power” in the United Nations bodies, agencies, conferences and 
General Assembly sessions, could be seen as another way to establish itself as a 
stronger player within the system. The South African government under the 
leadership of Thabo Mbeki have been successful in its international elevation and 
enabled the country to leverage its position to profile and promote issues of Africa’s 
development and onto the global agenda. Through initiatives such as NEPAD, even 
though hampered by a lack of African consensus has at least gained support from the 
G8 and placed on the UN agenda. 
 
The United Nations as an international organisation has the ability to shape the 
behaviour of its member states by the principles set out by the Charter of the United 
Nations. Each state as a member of the organisation agreed to abide to these principles 
upon becoming members. Both multilateralism and the UN’s role have been 
challenged by both external and internal threats. Unilateral initiatives by the United 
States government have undermined the very principles of collective action in its 
attacks in Iraq, and have used the organisation to legitimise these actions. Most of the 
US’s leverage within the organisation is its monetary contribution and has threatened 
on numerous occasions to withhold its member fees. 
 
Emanating from this study is that the middle power concept has proven to be a good 
analytical tool to gauge the behaviour of countries which tend towards these 
immediate powers. Middle powers exert influence on the multilateral level, carving 
out a “diplomatic niche”, and international organisations are usually the structures of 
choice as middle power have a better chance of building up consensus around certain 
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issues in the presence of big or more powerful countries. These actions strengthen 
rule-based systems and therefore limit any unilateral actions by bigger countries and 
in turn allow the smaller states to participate on an equal footing on the world stage. 
 
As a middle power South Africa has created coalitions with like minded states in the 
South (IBSA, G77+, NAM) in order to see its policies and ideals endorsed. As a 
bridge builder between the developing South and developed North, South Africa and 
Africa form part of the global village and the country’s development cannot be 
achieved in isolation. Even though South Africa has trouble gaining support from its 
African counterparts, within these alliances, with other regional powers like India and 
Brazil, who have been able to pursue their own national interests by strengthening 
trade and socio-cultural relations and also adhering to a common vision on reform and 
development.  
 
South Africa has effectively been driving its national interests and the interests of 
developing countries to achieve the MDG’s whilst pursuing NEPAD. It has also 
displayed its commitment to proper United Nations reform in the Myanmar case, 
where it was viewed as being insensitive to human rights violations by sticking to its 
principles around strengthening global governance.  
 
The country was concerned with the situation in Myanmar, but maintained that issues 
on human rights should not be brought to the Security Council as the situation was not 
a threat to international peace and security, and that the Human Rights Council was 
the most appropriate body to deal with it. This decision was also based on the Non-
aligned countries and the G77 and China’s constant calls of concern at the UNSC’s 
encroachment on mandates of other UN bodies 
 
By lobbying for changes membership of groupings such as the AU, the SADC, NAM, 
the Group of 77 and China (G77), IBSA and the Commonwealth should be utilised to 
lobby for common positions and an audible collective voice within the UN system 
(DFA Strategic Plan 2006-2009). 
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5.2 AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
 
This study made use of secondary data to observe how representatives of South Africa 
had articulated foreign policy objectives within its multilateral activity at the United 
Nations. Most of the data were retrieved from rhetoric in official statements made by 
foreign policy role players which has been helpful in reviewing important 
development in South Africa’s role at the UN. However, further quantitative studies 
could be conducted by recording and analysing voting trends of South Africa within 
the major bodies of the UN, and compare them to stated foreign policy objectives. 
This will provide a more in-depth analysis, of the coherency of policy and actions.  
South Africa’s voting data on particular issues can be compared to that of other major 
African countries and its allies in the South (i.e. Brazil, India etc.). In this way, one 
could articulate whether South Africa is committed to the African Renaissance and 
building stronger ties with its African peers to gain support for its development 
projects or in favour of building coalitions with its stronger partners in the developing 
world.  
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